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ABSTRACT 
A Relational Theory of Self: 
Emergence and Development 
February, 1984 
James L. Singer, B.A., Villanova University 
M.A., Villanova University 
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Bailey Jackson 
A model of self, viewing the pivotal dynamic of origin 
and development primarily as what goes on between people, is 
presented. Symbolic Interactionism is utilized as a major 
reference in establishing a relational framework. Con¬ 
sciousness is introduced as an inner forum of dialectical 
composition of address and response with others and certain 
constructs such as meaning, objects, interactions, and 
interiorization are defined as derivatives of this process. 
The origins of dialectical composition are then traced and a 
view of the unconscious as an interactive experience is 
explored. The structure of a relational theory of self is 
then philosophicallly grounded and scientifically sequenced 
in the works of Martin Buber and Teilhard de Chardin as the 
roots of dialectical composition and complexity-conscious¬ 
ness are discussed. A paradigm shift is then presented 
which integrates earlier constructs and establishes the 
VI 
foundation of relationalism as an essential phenomenon of 
human activity. A two level theory of self constituted 
through an integrative process of coalescence in interaction 
with others is then presented as the nodal point in the 
explanation and exploration of human behavior. Some basic 
implications of the theory for Human Service professionals 
are then discussed. 
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In the course of my doctoral program here at the 
University, I have in large part concentrated on the meaning 
and origin of "the self," In the process of my studies I 
became highly influenced by particular schools of thought 
that viewed the roots of psychological distress and recovery 
as being proportionate to an individual's sense of being 
disconnected/connected to important others in their life. 
This attraction led me to focus on the critical issues of 
psychological distress, ranging from incongruency to 
disfunctionality, as essentially an interactional or 
relational, phenomenon. 
For me the major pivotal dynamic of the 
healthy/unhealthy person is directly attributed to the indi¬ 
vidual's interaction with others. To say this in another 
way, it is the interpersonal context, relationships, that is 
the fundamental mooring around which individual behavior can 
be made sense of. It is this relationalism that is the 
nodal point, the essential phenomenon, in the explanation 
and exploration of human behavior. 
The inquiries of my graduate studies have drawn me in 
general to an interactional position—what goes on between 
1 
2 
people rather than the intra-psychic models and especially 
to adopt the theory of Symbolic Interactionism. 
Statement of the Problem 
The theoretical base of Symbolic Interactionism is con¬ 
structed on the assumption that human beings are social in 
nature. Not merely that we are affiliative, or search for 
belonging, or need social re-enforcement, but much more than 
this. There is another primary dimension to being 
relational that is as fundamental as being human itself. 
The basic tenet of Symbolic Interaction, as found in the 
writings of George Herbert Mead (1970), is that "the self" 
is socially constructed through interaction with others. It 
is from external interactions with others that inner, or 
symbolic, interactions evolve. And it is these symbolic 
interactions that form the basis for what comes to be ex¬ 
perienced as 'the self.' Or, as Symbolic Interactionists 
say, "We are our others!" Symbolic Interactionism is a 
theory of self based on human relationships. 
In a narrow discussion of the self, its origins and 
emergence. Symbolic Interactionists become vague and confus¬ 
ing. As stated, their position is that the self is realized 
in the process of relating with certain others. Yet, when 
pinpointed to explain and set a firm coherent formulation as 
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to how this genesis takes place, they generalize and become 
ambiguous. The language of Symbolic Interactionists in 
describing the "I" as an impulse, reflex, reaction, 
propulsion to act, etc., is loose, imprecise, and in need of 
clarification. When they reference 'the self' as 
relational, then does this mean that others are quite simply 
responsible for the creation of self from a blank slate? 
Does it mean that there is no internal core, no interior 
entity, no agent? 
Although the theory of self as developed in Symbolic 
Interaction is unique, it is not the only theoretical posi¬ 
tion which attempts to explain 'the self in relational 
terms. In the field of psychiatry, both Object Relations 
Theory (Fairbairns, 1954) and the Theory of Interpersonal 
Psychiatry (H. S. Sullivan, 1953) attempt to shift the focus 
away from the traditional psychoanalytic intrapsychic struc¬ 
tures and redefine psychiatry in relational terms. Both 
approaches, developing different concepts, view the ego as a 
relational concept and examine the way the ego emerges out 
of early mother-child interactions. Although these two 
theories are a departure from traditional psychoanalysis in 
developing interpersonal structures, they are not too 
distant. They retain many substantive commitments to the 
psychogenetic view of illness and give no attention to the 
question of on-going internalizations or relationships that 
4 
contribute to a developing self. in other words, the ego is 
critically set in the early years and is exclusively 
dependent on a single relationship, mother-child, without 
reference to how the self may continuously and dynamically 
grow through subsequent significant relationships. 
As one who has adopted an interactional perspective, it 
is unsettling that the pertinent questions raised in the 
above two perspectives remain unanswered with respect to a 
relational theory. Although these theories point in the 
direction of a relational model, they are either too obscure 
or too restricted. 
The problem then as viewed by this author is how to 
account for self emergence when the self is viewed as being 
socially constructed through interactions with others. 
Symbolic Interactionists begin to address this specific 
problem, but in our opinion their efforts fall short. The 
theory designed in this study attempts to build and expand 
upon the efforts of Symbolic Interactionists and add a qual¬ 
itatively new dimension to satisfactorily resolve this 
issue. 
Both as an educator in the field of Human Services and 
therapist, this issue of how the self is constructed and is 
proportionate to significant others has maintained long¬ 
standing interest. As a teacher both during supervision and 
subsequently, the role of authoritarianism and the content 
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of product and porformanc© standards of competition were 
exclusively emphasized. Students who could not measure up 
ho these criteria were viewed as failures, cut out of herd, 
and re-routed as rejects to euphemistically labeled special 
education structures. As a therapist, many of these same 
students were later referred as being uncommunicative acting 
out developing delinquents. Most of these students were 
indeed in distress and acting out from fear of losing, being 
left behind, being left alone, and not being good enough. 
Many of them had been labeled as learning disabled, yet in 
therapy their stressful self image appeared teacher-caused. 
If relations are the mooring point of behavior, the role of 
teacher could be significantly altered and the view of a 
healthy/unhealthy classroom and student radically improved. 
In therapy a relational theory of self would be able to 
shift the perception of how psychological issues may be 
viewed and realign the therapist's position in designing an 
interactional process of healthy recovery. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to clarify what is denoted 
by the term 'self and to propose how it emerges and contin¬ 
uously develops in a relational context. This dissertation, 
therefore, is a conceptual study regarding the relational 
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nature of self. 
This study proposes to directly address the problems of 
inadequacies and limitations that exist in the present rela¬ 
tional theories as overviewed in the above statement of the 
problem section. It seeks to resolve these pertinent ques¬ 
tions by developing a clear theoretical position regarding 
the genesis of "the self" and its continuous evolving 
process. 
It is the intent of this study to in part build on the 
supportive foundations of other theoretical relational per¬ 
spectives and develop a unique relational self theory. In 
addition to these theories, there are two other resources 
utilized in support of establishing a sound and logical 
basis. One is from the field of Philosophy, the second from 
the science of Anthropology. 
Philosophically this study elicits additional support 
from the humanistic philosophy of Martin Buber (I and Thou, 
1958) and his concept that it is only within relationship 
that personality and personal reality exists. It is from 
his concept of I-Thou, I-It, and the essential We, that man 
constructs and develops a world out of his experiences. It 
is, therefore, the connectedness of relationships that pro¬ 
vide the internal essential psychological reality. 
Anthropologically this study utilizes the factual 
scientific inquiries on the evolution of man as set forth by 
7 
Pierre Teilhard DeChardin (The Phenomenon of Man^ 1958) 
For Teilhard, life evolves from its simplest form reaching 
forward to the level of human development. Each development 
this process is one from the simple to the more intri¬ 
cate. Like Darwin, Teilhard documents that this movement to 
higher forms contains within itself a "favored axis of 
evolution." Unlike Darwin, however, this axis is not in the 
direction of 'survival of the fittest', but survival of the 
most complex. Teilhard's law of Complexity/Consciousness is 
the critical base of evolution. In simplistic terms, it is 
growth in interaction, a coming into relationship and lead¬ 
ing to the formation of a new entity. For Teilhard evolu¬ 
tion is not just a biological event, but underlies every¬ 
thing. With the advent of man Teilhard applies the 'law of 
convergence' to demonstrate how union results in different¬ 
iation and uniqueness. 
This study attempts to construct a genesis of 'the 
self.' The pertinence of Teilhard's thought is to in part 
look through the scientific microscope of evolution and his 
law of convergency to help clarify this view and locate it 
in a continuum of other scientific studies. 
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Significance of the Study 
As stated in the problem section, existing theories of 
a relational self suffer from a twofold inadequacy. On the 
one hand, the question of how the self emerges in Symbolic 
Interaction literature is underdeveloped and confusing. 
While on the other hand, the expositions of how the self may 
develop during adulthood is essentially overlooked by the 
narrow psychoanalytic visions of infant-mother formation. 
The significance of this study is that it will provide 
a theoretical foundation as to the origin and continuous 
development of 'the self and conclude with a consistent 
coherent theory interwoven with other scientific research 
that perceives 'the self' as relational in nature. 
The development of such a coherent position would pro¬ 
vide the theoretical underpinnings of the major pivotal 
dynamics regarding hypothesis of the healthy/unhealthy per¬ 
son in attempting to: 
1. Clarify the genesis of 'the self,' 
2. Contribute to the literature regarding a concept of 
the self as an on-going process of growth, 
3. Generate another new perspective of the substantive 
influence of relationships in people s lives, 
4. And apply this theoretical position regarding 
implications in the fields of human services and 
therapy. 
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Delimitations of the Study 
This study is designed to develop a conceptual formula¬ 
tion of the nature of self. Moreover to propose that this 
construct is relational in nature. In a broad sense we have 
chosen a particular framework to view our subject of study, 
thereby excluding other non-relational positions. As a con¬ 
sequence, there is strong concentration on the review of 
literature in the Symbolic Interaction section. Further, we 
have omitted specific authors who perhaps could be called in 
to assist us in such an interpersonal study, such as Fromm, 
Erikson, and Rogers. Their views of self, while intriguing, 
are of a different nature than that explored in this study. 
This study does not report in depth on the shift of 
focus within the psychoanalytic schools as represented by 
Object Relations Theory and Harry Stack Sullivan. Nor do we 
feel that any concentration on intra-school conflicts such 
as the role of aggression, libido, death, etc., would shed 
important light on these representative positions as given 
in our study. 
Neither do we pause to examine or debate the plausibil¬ 
ity of evolution. In this study we join firmly with the 
extensive community of multi-disciplinary scientists and 
accept evolution as a confirmed fact in the explanation of 
the history of the earth. 
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We do attempt to draw from a variety of relational 
positions and theories rather than any single model or a few 
inner-school variables. In this process we share in what is 
common, criticize what we think to be inadequate, and in 
this process of crystallization, clarify what we believe to 
be our own. 
Methodology 
This study purports to develop a theory, namely a rela¬ 
tional theory of self. Methodologists Sjoberg and Nett 
(1968) define a theory as a system of concepts linked by 
discrete observations; i.e. logically interrelated proposi¬ 
tions brought together by the various aspects of problem 
definition, collection of evidence, limitations, analysis, 
and concurrence or conclusions. In general this is a qual¬ 
itative, exploratory study. Within the frame of psycho-edu¬ 
cational research, since this study is designed to add to 
the body of knowledge regarding self and also intended to be 
of practical use to human service professionals, it is both 
basic and applied research (Lehmans and Mehrens, 1971). 
Following the methods of theory construction as outlined by 
Julian Simon (1978), Lehmans and Mehrens (1971) and Sjoberg 
and Nett (1968), this study explores and develops in a con¬ 
trolled manner a relational theory of self. The methodology 
11 
utilized follows patterns of discovery (Hanson, 1958) and 
the logical-theorectical construct system of theory develop¬ 
ment . 
Hanson's "pattern of discovery," or concept of retro- 
duction, refer to the observation of "facts" and construc¬ 
tion of a theory to explain these facts (1958). It simply 
means one is confronted with a set of data, or problem, that 
has not in the observer's opinion been adequately accounted 
for; and, therefore, one reasons back from the observations 
in order to construct a theory that will account for them. 
Hanson cuts through much of the controversy about theory 
development with his statement: 
"A theory is not pieced together from 
observed phenomena; it is what makes it 
possible to observe phenomena as being a 
certain sort, as related to other phe¬ 
nomena. Theories put phenomena into 
systems" (Hanson, 1958; 90). 
The method of logical-theoretical construction is a 
three component approach to theory development: basic 
assumptions regarding reality, logical constructs, and 
substantive generalizations (Sjoberg and Nett, 1968). It is 
a process of logic that holds events or factors constant in 
a series of corroborative observations for the purpose of 
scrutiny and concurrence. The three components of this 
methodology have been incorporated in the design of this 
study as outlined in the following paragraphs. 
The assumption of fluidity or of stability in the 
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social order is rather basic in this study. This study 
takes the position that while there is a degree of order in 
the social world, it emphasizes the everchanging nature of 
social reality and views the social order as in a state of 
becoming. This is in opposition to the position that social 
reality is basically fixed and stable. Associated with the 
premise of fluidity and of rigidity are assumptions concern¬ 
ing the extent of man's control over his environment. This 
study speaks to the issue and develops the position that 
individuals do not simply react, but rather have the ability 
to shape their environment. An additional assumption 
relates to integration rather than conflict, i.e., we 
individually attempt to avoid tension and conflict and 
strive toward harmony. In general the assumptions which 
underlie this study can be classified as optimistic rather 
than pessimistic, rational rather than irrational, rela¬ 
tional rather than material. These basic assumptions are 
connected to and substantially expanded upon in the review 
of literature section covering Symbolic Interactionism in 
Chapter I. 
Employing Symbolic Interactionism as a base, this study 
then defines and clarifies in Chapter II important anchoring 
constructs that the author's notions are set within in order 
to reduce the potential for ambiguity or logic inconsistency 
in subsequent theory progression. Chapter III introduces 
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the construct of early meaning to focus on factors of other- 
theory comparison and to develop consistency and departure 
aspects. Though unrelated to the fundamental reference of 
Symbolic Interactionism, the models of Interpersonal Psychi¬ 
atry and Object Relations theory are included as attempts to 
explain the self in relational terms and as such offer 
insight, compatibility, and basic influence points (Lehman 
and Mehrens, 1971), 
In addition to the clarity and definitions of con¬ 
structs in theory development, any proposed theory must 
yield to consistency and coherence gathered in the require¬ 
ments of inductive, reductive, or system of synthesis 
(Simon, 1978), They must be grounded in sets of connected 
assumptions, beliefs, intuitions, etc,, that rest on philo¬ 
sophical congruence. This study then identifies the 
philosophical roots and connection of this study and pro¬ 
ceeds a step further in this location and congruence by 
linking it to the historical patterns and advance of living 
organisms. This construction is designed not only to render 
philosophical congruence, but with the material of anthro¬ 
pology provide continuity within the study of evolution. By 
looking at the interweavings of these philosophical and 
anthropological findings using panel analysis (Galtung, 
1977), we attempt to further integrate this congruence as 
well as set the stage for a relational theory of self. 
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Th0 factors of reliability and validity of evidence in 
the development of theory that emphasizes verstehen, or 
understanding, rather than prediction emerge from construct 
consistency and logic interrelatedness (Sjoberg and Nett, 
1968) . The validity of evidence in this study relies on 
construct stability and logic, as well as an availability 
and utility which warrants the connections of constructs. 
The issue of stability and logic stands with each construct 
chapter, the question of their connectedness is the focus of 
Chapter V. Reliability in qualitative theory construction 
refers to the concurrence of consistency by observers 
regarding the set of evidence or data; validity refers to 
adequacy of this evidence relative to the hypothesis (Simon, 
1978) . 
The final chapter represents the third component of 
substantive generalization or synthesis. Through the method 
of definition and explanation, the theory is set forth 
through the integration of constructs. The adequacy, util¬ 
ity, and validity of the preceding chapters are put to the 
test of reader support or negation, and the question of 
whether this theory construction speaks as a disciplined 
insight in a coherent manner to the problem raised and 




Symbol. The origins and constant reference for Symbolic 
Interaction can be traced back to the works of George 
Herbert Mead (1863-1931). Since the principle sources of 
his thought are from publication of his lectures and notes 
after his death, the following discussion relies heavily on 
the writings of his students (Blumer, 1969; Meltzer, 1964; 
Stryker, 1956; Rose, 1961; Denizen, 1972), 
Symoblic Interactionists claim that we live in a 
symbolic environment as well as a physical one; and that it 
is in the symbolic world rather than the physical one that 
we are truly human. A symbol is defined as a stimulus that 
has learned meaning and value for people, and our response 
to a symbol is in terms of its meaning and value rather than 
its physical stimulation to our senses. A meaning is 
equivalent to a true dictionary definition, the way people 
actually use a term. A value is a learned attraction or 
repulsion we feel toward the meaning. 
As Ornstein demonstrates there is no way we can 
encounter physical reality in the 'raw,' directly; we pull 
out certain stimuli and ignore other stimuli and in this way 
make sense out of our world (Ornstein, 1972; Chapter One). 
Symbolic Interactionists agree and contend that this nomic 
process happens symbolically in the inner forum. 
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Practically all the symbols we learn are learned 
through communications (interactions) with other people, and 
so symbols can be thought of as common or shared communica¬ 
tion. Human beings have a distinct capacity for symbol 
communication because we alone among the animals have a 
vocal apparatus for a large number and wide range of 
different sounds, and have a complex nervous system which 
can store up the meanings and values of millions of symbols. 
The reality of 'out there,' therefore, is developed in 
interaction with others. We interpret the world according 
to meanings and definitions achieved through interaction. 
Symbolic Interactionists do not deny objective, physical 
reality. They merely state that this reality is not re¬ 
sponded to directly. Objects exist, but for human beings 
they are pointed out and given meaning through interaction 
with others. According to Bernard Meltzer, "Objects are 
social objects in a very real sense" (Meltzer, 1964; 6). 
Interaction. Mead (1934) identified two kinds of inter¬ 
action: one animal, the other human. He claimed that 
psychology would have to take covert as well as external 
phenomena into account to understand the human. Internal 
phenomena differed from external only in degree of accessi¬ 
bility. Additionally, he believed these to be two 
dimensions of the single process of constructed human 
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action, and the less accessible could be inferred by viewing 
the unity of the human act. 
"What one must insist upon is that ob¬ 
jectively observable behavior finds 
expression within the individual, not 
in the sense of being in another world, 
a subjective world, but in the sense of 
being within his organism. Something 
of this behavior appears in what we may 
term 'attitudes' the beginning of acts. 
Now, if we come back to such attitudes 
we find them giving rise to all sorts 
of responses" (Mead, 1934, p.ll9). 
Only in viewing the human act in its entirety, its 
beginning (internally) and in its development, can human 
behavior truly be studied. 
According to Mead, the 
human action is the ability 
peculiar capability to construct 
to communicate. Practically all 
the symbols we learn are learned through communications 
(interactions) with other people, and so symbols can be 
thought of as shared communication. Mead believed that ani¬ 
mals do not communicate, but rather interact in a limited 
sense through a "conversation of gestures." 
"Two hostile dogs, in the pre-fight 
stage, may go through an elaborate con¬ 
versation of gestures (snarling, 
walking stiff-legged, baring fangs). 
The two dogs are adjusting themselves 
to one another by responding to 
gestures. (A gesture is that portion 
of the act which represents the entire 
act; it is the initial phase of the act 
which epitomizes it, e.g.; shaking 
one's fist at someone). Now, in the 
case of the dogs the response to a ges¬ 
ture is dictated by pre-established 
tendencies to respond in certain ways. 
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Each gesture leads to a direct, automa¬ 
tic, unreflecting response by the 
recipient of the gesture (the other 
dog). Neither dog responds to 
intention. Further, neither makes his 
gesture with the intent of eliciting 
certain responses in the other. Thus 
it is devoid of deliberate meaning" 
(Meltzer, 1964; 6-7). 
Animals consequently respond directly to the gestures and 
actions of the other organisms. The activity of the organ¬ 
ism is "released" by the gesture or action impinging on it. 
Infra human behavior is a series of direct, automatic 
response to stimuli (Meltzer, 1964). It is not reflectively 
constructed, nor is the infra human capable of standing 
outside itself and imagining how the other will respond to 
its actions. Animals are incapable of perceiving themselves 
as objects and cannot construct their actions accordingly. 
Humans, on the other hand, develop the capability of 
interacting through "significant" gestures or symbols, i.e., 
symbols that have the quality of being shared by the 
participants in any given situation. For Mead symbols are 
significant because they have meaning to both the user and 
to the other with whom one communicates. We use symbols to 
indicate meaning so that it will make sense to the other. 
Significant gestures, or symbols, are not, therefore, an 
individual act but are by their very nature social, are 
meaningful to more than one (Rose, 1961). To understand 
more deeply the concept of significant symbols, it would be 
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helpful to examine the human act in its entirety. 
The—Human Act. Human beings have the capacity to stand 
outside of what they enact, to see themselves as partici¬ 
pants. We can view the drama and ourselves as unfolding 
with a past and future. By having a perspective outside of 
ourselves, we can respond to and modify our behavior from 
that perspective. For purposes of analysis Mead breaks this 
interaction down and begins with what he calls an "impulse" 
on the part of the actor. An impulse is an all inclusive 
term from a hunger experience to a wish to respond to the 
statement of another. 
This impulse arises from the individual subject which 
Mead called the "I." Next, rather than following directly 
the impulse and moving toward the other participant in the 
interaction, the individual is able to "take on the attitude 
of the other" internally. He imagines how the other will 
react to his imagined action by placing himself in the 
position of the other and viewing himself "objectively." 
This is what Mead called the "me". In this way each is able 
to access both his own and the other's response to his 
imagined behavior. This affords each the opportunity to 
block or inhibit aspects of his behavior which he considers 
inappropriate in that context and/or to adjust his action in 
accordance with his expectations of the environmental 
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response. Each is able to modify their behavior internally 
as it develops. 
For Mead it is this very aspect, the combining of "I" 
and "me", i.e., interaction, that is truly formative of 
human behavior. It is in the process that individuals 
create their environment and complete any on-going action. 
The ability to represent his world internally and effect 
active control over it by this formative aspect of human 
action has profound implications in understanding thought, 
knowing, and reality. 
Symbolic Interactionists emphasize our world is a 
symbolic one. Individuals see, think, hear, share, and act 
symbolically. Symbols are critical because it is precisely 
said, "They are our reality". As human beings, individuals 
act within a world of social objects. That is, we act 
toward a world defined by others through communication. We 
share with others a definition of the world and its objects. 
Objects are transformed from physical stimuli responded to 
automatically into objects socially constructed. Each time 
we interact with others we come to share a somewhat 
different view of what we are seeing. As we interact we 
develop a perspective as to what is real and how we are to 
act toward that reality. It is through symbolic interaction 
with each other that we give the world meaning and develop 
the reality toward which we act. "Meaning arises out of the 
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interaction that one has with ones fellows." (Bluroer, 1969; 
19) . 
Self. In the stream of interactional thought it follows 
that the self is a social object. Like all other social 
objects it is something shared with others in interaction. 
"The individual comes to see self in interaction with 
others...it is pointed out and defined socially" (Meltzer, 
1864; 8). The individual becomes able to experience self, 
or see self, as a separate object because of interactions 
with others. We become 'objects' to ourselves because of 
others . 
In the beginning an individual is unable to make a 
distinction between himself and the rest of the world. How, 
then, does such a distinction take place? Symbolic Inter- 
actionists say it is through the action of others. (McCall 
and Simmons, 1966; 207). The self then is an object social 
in origin and also an object that undergoes change like all 
other objects. So, not only does the self arise in inter¬ 
action with others but again, like all other social objects, 
is defined and redefined in interaction. Stryker sums this 
up as follows: 
"The human organism as an object takes 
on meaning through the behavior of 
those who respond to that organism. We 
come to know what we are through others 
response to us. Others supply us with 
a name, and supply the meaning attached 
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to that symbol. They categorize us in 
particular ways-as an object, an 
infant, boy, girl, etc. On the basis 
of that categorization, they expect 
particular behavior from us; on the 
basis of expectations, they act toward 
us" (Stryker, 1956; 309). 
The manner in which others act towards us defines our 
'self, and we come to categorize ourselves as they catego¬ 
rize us. As the child comes into the social world he comes 
into contact with a variety of persons in a variety of self¬ 
relevant situations. The child comes into contact with dif¬ 
fering expectations concerning his behavior and differing 
identities on which these expectations are based. "Thus he 
has a variety of perspectives from which to view and 
evaluate his own behavior; he acts with reference to self as 
well as with reference to others" (Stryker, 1956; 314), 
The Symbolic Interactionists attempt to become more 
explicit suggesting stages of development. Preparatory 
Stage is the first inferred by Mead, a pre-self, or pre- 
symbolic stage of self. Meltzer describles it as here the 
child acts like the adult does; it is clearly imitative and 
lacks meaning. (Meltzer, 1964, 9). The adult smiles, then 
the child smiles; or an adult points, then the child points. 
It is purely imitational and social objects, including the 
self, are yet to be defined with words that have meaning. 
The Play Stage comes early during the acquisition of 
language. This begins to happen very early, so the first 
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stage is really insignificant in terms of length of time. 
Now learning language, the child is able to define and label 
objects with words that have shared meaning. So what was 
acted toward originally as imitation is now acted toward 
according to the meaning shared in interaction with others. 
The child plays mother, teacher, policeman, etc. What is of 
central importance is that it places the child in the posi¬ 
tion where it is able to act back toward itself in such 
roles. The child first begins to form a self. "The 
creation of self as social object is an identification of 
that object...it involves naming and once an object is named 
and identified a line of action can be taken toward it." 
(Denizen, 1972; 306). It is during this stage that the 
child introjects significant others, usually parents, 
relatives, siblings. As the child grows the possibilities 
of significant others increases greatly and can be a whole 
number of individuals. 
Significant others are critically important to us, they 
are responsible for the emergence of self. For we come to 
view ourselves as an object because of significant others. 
During this stage the child is incapable of seeing himself 
from the perspective of too many others simultaneously. It 
is a time when the child takes the role of significant 
others, but very few, and acts as if he were these indivi¬ 
duals. (Meltzer, 1964; 9-10). 
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The Game Stage is the completing stage of self. The 
game represents organization and the necessity of assuming 
several significant others simultaneously. Cooperation and 
group life demands knowing one's position in relation to a 
complex set of others, not just a few single others. For 
Mead, this is the adult stage of self. "The child puts 
together the significant others in his world into a whole, a 
generalized other system." (Karp and Yoels, 1979; 38-39). 
The self then serves as an object of symbolic inter¬ 
action, As the individual communicates with himself, he is 
both a subject and an object in communication. Because of 
this we are able to think, i.e., able to point out things to 
ourselves, to interpret. "The possession of a self provides 
the human being with a mechanism of self interaction with 
which to meet the world." (Blumer, 1966; 535). Mead says, 
"The essence of the self lies in the internalized conversa¬ 
tion which constitutes thinking, or in our terms of which 
thought or reflection proceeds." (Mead, 1934; 173). To 
think is to speak to oneself. 
Identities. Clearly one is not born with a pre-formed self, 
but rather it is a progression. It is through the reflected 
appraisals of others that we come to define ourselves as 
certain kinds of persons. 
Our identities are established and validated through 
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the response which others make to us. in Symbolic Inter- 
actionist literature identities are used instead of identity 
to emphasize Wm. James' notion that we have as many selves 
as we have memberships in different social groups, such as 
family, religions, friendships, etc. "We adjust our behav¬ 
ior accordingly to take into account the particular 
situation and others with whom we are interacting." (Karp 
and Yoels, 1979; 36). As Mead puts it: 
"We carry on a whole series of different 
relationships to different people. We 
are one thing to one and another thing 
to another. We divide ourselves up 
into all sorts of different selves with 
reference to our friends. We discuss 
religion with one and politics with 
another. There are all sorts of dif¬ 
ferent selves answering to all sorts of 
different social relations" (Mead, 
1934; 142). 
For Symbolic Interactionists interaction is always 
oriented toward the future, to what the other will do. The 
only way we can anticipate the future is through this kind 
of mutual role-taking. From the Symbolic Interactionist 
perspective, the development of the self is inextricably 
bound up with the capacity to take the role of the other. 
Every act of role-taking simultaneously involves anticipa¬ 
tion of the response that others are going to make toward 
us, and our reflection of our own behavior in view of these 
interpretations of other's response (Karp and Yoels, 1979; 
38) . 
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Self as Object. As emphasized above, self is an object; it 
is pointed out and shared in interaction, Blumer repeats 
often that the importance of self as object cannot be under¬ 
stated: "It means that the individual can act toward 
himself as he acts toward all other objects." (Blumer, 
1969; 11). We can judge, communicate, and manipulate other 
objects; and so we can do this also with the self. 
Self and Identify ("I" and "Me"). During his lifetime. Mead 
had to respond to the criticism that his theory was merely a 
form of social determinism, i.e., that an individual is 
merely pressed out and conforms to sets of expectations 
provided by significant others. He countered that we do 
have freedom of action and posited his central notion that 
the self is comprised of components—the "I and the "me." 
"The I is the response of the organism 
to the attitudes* of the others; the Me 
is the organized set of attitudes of 
others which one himself assumes. The 
attitudes of others constitute the or¬ 
ganized Me, and then one reacts toward 
that as an I" (Mead, 1934; 175). 
♦Attitude means a truncated or incipient act, a beginning. 
The sense that one has acted, is acting, and will act 
further. It is a poor term to imply an incipience that 
permits one to anticipate what is about to occur...we 
anticipate what is being proposed by another. 
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The "I" IS the individual as subject, the "me" consti¬ 
tutes the person as object. The "I" is something that is, 
so to speak, responding to a situation that is within the 
experience of the individual (Mead, 1934; 177). 
The Symbolic Interactionist seem to have a difficult 
time pinning down just what is the "I." Meltzer calls the I 
"this active nature that gives propulsion to the act." 
(Meltzer, 1972; 17) . McCall and Simmons describe an "active 
agent" (1966; 54). Mead states, "it is the I, or rather it 
is because of the I that we say we are never fully aware of 
what we are, it gives the sense of freedom, of initiative." 
(Mead, 1934; 177-178). Yes, we do direct our acts; and yes, 
others highly influence our acts. Karp and Yoels describe 
the "Me" as the significant others in us, representing the 
more conventional aspects of self (1979; 49). 
Mind. For Symbolic Interactionist mind is probably best de¬ 
scribed or defined as symbolic interaction with the self. 
"It is active communication with the 
self through the manipulations of 
symbols; an inner flow of speech... that 
calls out intelligent response. We 
manipulate symbols covertly; we think, 
engaged in minded behavior, we 
literally hold conversations with 
ourselves" (Mead, 1934; 182). 
Blumer says the mind is conscious activity, anything 
the individual indicates to himself from the time we awaken 
until we fall asleep. "It is a continuous flow of self 
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indications-notations of things with which we deal and take 
into account" (1962; 182). We walk into situation; we 
determine what is important for us in those situations, we 
define the situations, that is mind activity. 
When we indicate things to ourselves, we isolate, 
label, develop lines of action toward things. We do not 
respond passively, but actively by defining. This is minded 
behavior. The world is transformed into a world of defini¬ 
tions because of mind. Action is a response not to objects, 
but our active interpretation of these objects (Blumer, 
1966; 69). We think about what we are to do before we do 
it. Mind makes possible the rehearsal of acts. "Mind, 
according to Mead, is what constitutes the self in 
action...mental emerges out of the organic life of man 
through communication" (Meltzer, 1964; 12). 
Mead claims that the central principle of all organic 
behavior is that of continuous adjustment or adaptation to 
an environing field. This is not the same for all organism 
as behavior involves 'selected attention.' We accept cer¬ 
tain events and reject others. Perception is an activity of 
'selective attention' to particular aspects of a situation. 
The origin and function of the mind is social; it arises 
through communication, through association with others. The 
mind rises and is maintained in this process (Meltzer, 1964; 
18) . 
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The mind is social in function in the sense that we 
continually indicate to ourselves the role of others and 
control our activities with reference to the definitions 
provided by others. By taking the role of others, we see 
ourselves as others see us, and arouse in ourselves the 
response that we call out in others. It is this conversa¬ 
tion with ourselves between the representation of the other 
(in the form of the me) and our impulse of first reflex (in 
the form of the I) that constitutes the mind. 
So what we actually do in minded behavior is to carry 
on internal conversations. By addressing ourselves from the 
standpoint of the 'generalized other, the individual has a 
universe of discourse, a system of common symbols and means, 
with which to address himself (Meltzer, 1964; 14-15). 
Role-Taking. For Symbolic Interactionist, taking the role 
of others is critical to the development of self and the 
most important mental activity. When Mead discussed the im¬ 
portance of significant others and generalized others in the 
development of self, he points out that these others who are 
so important to the child constitutes those whose role the 
child takes as his own. 
To recall the stages of development: 
Preparatory Stage - The child imitates the acts of 
There is no awareness, only imitation. significant others. 
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Play StagG Th© child takes the role of significant 
others, seeing self, directing self, identifying self from 
the perspective of significant others. It is one role at a 
t ime. 
Game Stage - The child's selfhood has matured into an 
organized whole. The child takes the roles of 'generalized 
others ' . 
Rose amplifies this by saying, "We take the other's 
role inferring perspectives from the other's action" (Rose, 
1961; 17). Mead claims role taking precedes mind, symbols, 
and self in the child's development. The child first imi¬ 
tates the acts of other's, takes in. From the simple begin¬ 
ning of imitation comes the earliest glimmerings of the 
object we call self. 
Obviously, role-taking is much more than the child 
playing at the roles of others. Play is an example of role¬ 
taking. Role-taking is an integral part, necessary for 
understanding the other and being understood by the other. 
"The individual experiences himself as 
such, not directly, but indirectly, 
from the particular standpoint of 
others. For he enters his own exper¬ 
iences as a self...insofar as he 
becomes an object to himself just as 
others are objects to him or in his 
experiences" (Mead, 1934; 138). 
The child takes the role of significant others, then 
develops a generalized other and so we judge, direct self, 
and all the other self processes come into being. "We learn 
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how to view reality in this way" (Karp and Yoels, 1979; 19). 
Meltzer says to know the total act for which a gesture 
stands for "one must put himself in the position of the 
other" (Meltzer, 1964; 19), The mechanism of role-taking is 
this incorporation of others; the individual internalizes 
others into his own conduct (Meltzer, 1964; 19-20). 
Human being are constantly acting in relation to each 
other. Communicating symbolically, "we are in a vast pro¬ 
cess, continuously in interaction" (Blumer, 1969; 20). In 
this process of taking in significant others, symbolically 
interacting with them, our behavior occurs. As Blumer 
states (1962) it is through this process that human beings 
construct conscious action. We do not, therefore, respond 
to a world out there, but to a reality actively shaped by us 
in symbolic interaction. 
Summary 
Thus far we have presented a model that addresses 
individuals as active agents, who construct action, and 
have attempted to set out the foundations for this capacity. 
We have described conscious action as a process of symbolic 
interaction with others through interiorization, and have 
referenced consciousness as an inner forum of I and me. 
To develop this model further, a number of questions require 
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response such as; how do individuals become participants in 
a shared construction of reality, how is the notion of the 
unconscious accounted for in this action construction? In 
order to set the stage for answering these question, we will 
consider some additional constructs to gradually introduce 
and frame the base for the meaning of relational ism. 
CHAPTER I I 
RELATIONAL CONSTRUCTS 
This Study proposes that the self emerges and develops 
in union with others, and that this being-in-relation is 
central to the exploration and explanation of human 
behavior. Such a proposition represents a paradigm shift, 
and therefore certain assumptions and concepts require de¬ 
finition and location to become functional constructs. This 
chapter intends to establish these constructs and to set the 
stage for the exposition of our proposition. 
Meaning 
To understand reality as an interactional creation, the 
nature of meaning must be considered within the context of 
the human act. Meaning is not a property intrinsic to ob¬ 
jects, but rather arises from how a person is prepared to 
act toward them (Blumer, 1969). Between objects "out there" 
and as individuals overt response is a perspective or 
meaning. Objects are addressed and responded to by a "line 
of action" one is about to take toward them. Meaning then 
goes beyond a mere dictionary definition as it includes all 
the varied images and attitudes that an object elicits for a 
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person. This is not to say that objects have no reality 
outside of our knowing them, but rather that we make them 
meaningful in our acting in relation to them, in reflec¬ 
tively noting them to ourselves. 
A tree is not the same to a lumberman, 
a botanist, or a poet; a star is a 
different object to modern astronomer 
than it was to a sheepherder of 
antiquity; communism is a different ob¬ 
ject to a Soviet patriot than it is to 
a Wall Street broker" (Blumer, 1969; 
69) . 
Objects 
The term, object, is used in its broadest sense. 
Objects are not limited to inanimate things, but include 
everything that can have meaning for a person; things, other 
people, ideas, morals, etc. The definition of objects is 
normally derived with others. To a great extent we identify 
our world according to what we have learned from others. 
Objects are pointed out and given meaning through inter¬ 
action with others. Objects are pointed out and given 
meaning through interaction with others. Children 
constantly want to know "What's this?" "What's that?". Most 
objects have an almost infinite number of social meanings, 
and so each object constitutes a multitude of social 
objects. Objects exist, yes; but in the experimental world 
of human behavior they are pointed out and given meaning 
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through interaction with others. 
Most meaning of objects then is not a private esoteric 
affair, but a common or shared one. In other words, two or 
more people act toward a given object in the same way. 
Because of our ability to stand outside ourselves and take 
on the perspective of the other, we are able to act toward 
objects as we imagine the other does. We are then able to 
assess, modify, reject meaning on the basis of the other's 
behavior. It is people in interaction that give meaning to 
objects, create them, change them (Shibutani, 1961). The 
penal code certainly has different meaning for the criminal 
than it does for the judge. Judge Parker is a different 
person to his wife, children, colleagues, and the accused. 
Futhermore, Judge Parker takes on different meanings for his 
wife depending on the action she is engaged in when she 
indicates or notes her husband to herself. Reality is thus 
constructed, maintained, and transformed constantly in the 
context of on-going action. The meaning of objects arises 
in interaction; in this way it is a relational, co-creative, 
process. 
Human Interaction 
Earlier we used the example of two hostile dogs to 
describe infra-human behavior. We established this 
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"conversation of gestures" as automatic, direct, unreflect¬ 
ing, without interruption or interpretation as a stimulus 
and response sequence. Human interaction, however, is not a 
direct response to the activities of the other, but rather a 
response to the intention of the other. Two men engaged in 
a heated argument are quite different from two men light- 
heartedly and affectionately exchanging blows. In the 
one would respond with tenseness, becoming defensive, 
preparing for battle. In the second, one would be jokingly 
involved without fear, preparation to survive, or mobilizing 
for attack. Response is based on the meaning derived in the 
midst of understanding the entire act. In our example one 
is a challenge, the other a sign of affection. The what and 
the how of the response is predicated on its being 
consistent with the intent of the other, that both agree. 
In either example, both men ascribe a common meaning and use 
this meaning in their action construction. 
Human interaction then consists of two or more people 
involved in a serial process of impulse, perception, inhibi¬ 
tion and transformation of impulse through reflective role¬ 
taking, mediated through shared meaning. 
Human interaction, because it creates meaning, 
constitutes objects not constituted before; i.e., objects 
which would not exist except for the context of a 
relationship where meaning occurs. In short, human 
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interaction is reflective, self conscious; infra-human gest¬ 
ures are not. We do not imply in this statement that infra¬ 
human activity is not conscious (our own opinion is indeed 
to the contrary), but merely that it is not reflective con¬ 
sciousness. Human interaction engages the ability to stand 
outside of what is enacted, to see ourselves as participants 
and the act unfolding. 
Interiorization 
In the interactionist model self is also an object. 
Therefore, it derives its meaning within the experience of 
being relational. Like all other objects, it is pointed out 
and gathers meaning through interaction; like all other 
objects we do not experience ourselves directly. An 
individual enters his own experience as a self insofar as he 
becomes an object to himself, just as others are objects to 
him (Mead, 1934). To acheive this reality of self, we place 
ourselves in the position of others toward us. As inter- 
actionists say, we role-take; we do this through a process 
of internalizing others. This within of others is simply 
all those perspectives on oneself that each has learned from 
others. Mead (1934) refers to this as the "me". 
We have seen that the world of meaning is an interior 
one, definitions pointed out and achieved with others. So, 
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too, the definition of self begins with and continues from 
the definition and interaction with others. We become 
objects to ourself because of others. A newborn is undif¬ 
ferentiated and unable to make distinctions between hemself 
and the rest of the world. It takes on meaning through the 
behavior of others who respond to the infant. Others supply 
us with a name and the meaning attached to that symbol. 
They categorize us in particular ways, on the basis of that 
categorization expect particular behaviors, on the basis of 
those expectations reward and punish, encourage and dis¬ 
courage, set limits; they act toward us (Stryker, 1956). As 
we develop in infancy, childhood, and later life, we become 
aware of our self in this way. The self then is an object 
social in origin, and one that undergoes changes like all 
other social objects. 
The interiorizing of others is a critical construct; we 
will emphasize it further. An infant does not come into the 
world with a developed self. At first it functions at a 
level of non-meaning and imitation. You smile at the baby, 
it smiles back; you point, it points. This phase, inter- 
actionists contend, is followed by one where the acquisition 
of language occurs, and the child begins to label and define 
objects with words that have shared meaning. At first 
haltingly with errors in terms of definition and 
pronunciation as parent/caretaker react with approval. 
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repetition, and continuous distinctions. 
"So, for example, the child may use the 
sound ba" to refer to any approxi¬ 
mately round object—ball, orange, sgg~ 
around the floor. The response of the 
parent to the rolling of an egg, 
especially a raw egg, will soon make 
clear that an egg is not a "ba" and 
that it should not be rolled on the 
floor. In the course of time, the 
child and parent will come to agree on 
what is and is not a ball. Thus a sig¬ 
nificant symbol will come into 
existence. A sound, at first meaning¬ 
less to the child, comes to mean what 
it already means to the adult" (Karp 
and Yoels, 1979; 42-43). 
This stage tendency to imitation is a tremendous aid as 
parents reinforce, select, and connect sounds and defini¬ 
tions, sharpen and extend meanings. As words are attached 
to objects so also are present attitudes toward that object. 
A snake is not merely pointed out, it may also be disdained 
or recoiled from, and the child perceives that reaction and 
adopts it along with the proper word. So in this process of 
imitation and presentation of words, definitions, and mean¬ 
ings, a child is encouraged that a ball includes throwing, 
catching, hitting; mud pies are not healthy; coal does not 
make good snacks; dirty is not delightful, etc. With the 
responses are the attitudes, and they are taught along with 
the labels. The child begins to understand what parents 
want him to do; in turn, he can better predict what they 
will do if he does or does not comply. 
The very simple world of imitation becomes more 
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complex, for as this activity is repeated time and again, 
the infant no longer needs to count on it so overtly. The 
ability to help him construct his activity can be taken 
internally from memory of the interact. The infant comes to 
represent the interacts and actors within, as he holds the 
interacts, the responses of others, the things they would 
say, and so on. Having taken on as his own the attitudes he 
once imitated, he merely acts accordingly without exclusive 
dependency on recourse to imitation. Through this repeti¬ 
tion and increased complexity from being in relation to 
other, the child begins to attribute a new quality of being 
an object to himself. 
Beyond infancy the child enacts roles of mother, 
father, teacher, rock star, etc. Doll playing is typical of 
this, as the child is able to act back upon itself in such 
roles. In other words, we begin to take others into our¬ 
selves. We view ourselves as an object because of others 
acting toward us, and our enacting those roles toward 
ourselves. At first the roles are few when the child acts 
as if he were these individuals. The classic example of a 
child responding to himself from the perspective of an adult 
is the situation in which he begins to do something, stops, 
slaps himself on the hand saying, "No, no Teddy. Don't do 
that." The child experiences an impulse and then overtly 
responds to himself from the role of the other. In so doing 
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he alters the flow of his activity. Through imitation the 
child incorporates the attitude of the other, speaks to 
himself, and so monitors his beharior in a more or less 
socially acceptable way. 
The object called self is being learned in interaction 
as the child is encouraged, discouraged, affirmed, correct¬ 
ed, etc., and given meaning by others through an array of 
communicative acts. By taking this response-of-others 
within, or simply others, the child develops the ability to 
stand outside himself, to be reflective. From external in¬ 
teractions with others, inner interactions evolve. It is a 
progressive development from undifferentiation to distinc¬ 
tion through communicative acts of address and response. 
Dialectical Composition 
Without the ability to interiorize others, our world 
indeed would be an unpredictable, frustrating, uncontroll¬ 
able place. We have stated that people live in a symbolic 
world and that what comes to be experienced as 'self 
results from a process of interiorizing others. How then 
does this interiorizing others take place? 
Interactionist contend that our knowledge of external 
nature is determined by our social experiences in 
communication (Cottrell, 1969). Reality then is constructed 
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in communicative acts, in address and response. In this way 
then it is in communication that the exchange of recognition 
of meaning takes place. If there is no mutual recognition 
of meaning, communication breaks down, and the claim is made 
that 'we are unable to communicate', and dialogue breaks 
off. When a reference for a symbol is learned, not only the 
word but a set of attitudes (how one is prepared to act 
towards that object) is learned. it is beyond dictionary 
difinition. To assert here that communication is restricted 
to linguistic acumen would be inadequate for language is but 
a portion of the composition of communication. Although we 
hold that definitions are primarily fashioned through lan¬ 
guage, meaning is accomplished through multiple levels of 
interchanges such as eye movement, kinesthetics, tone, 
touch, volume, space, feelings, etc. 
Linguistics, then, as the capacity to use and arrange 
speech, is too limited and arbitrary, too subject to inac¬ 
curacy and deceit, to comprise the full medium of this 
communicative flow. In this study we are more closely 
aligned with recent research on brain hemispheres and 
lateral thinking to view communication so narrowly (Springer 
& Deutsch, 1981). Communication is used here in a much 
larger and complementary context to signify the position of 
address and response around common agreement in verbal/non¬ 
verbal interacts. Meaning arises and is achieved in a 
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social process; it is a structure of mutuality. It is in 
this way that communicative acts are said to be inter¬ 
dependent, interactive, and interconnected. 
The interiorizing of others then is not some semi- 
mystical process, but simply through the process of commun¬ 
ication, which due to its many forms and levels we prefer to 
call dialectical composition. Because human beings act pri¬ 
marily through the exchange of communicative symbols, the 
construction of reality occurs through a dialectical system. 
Through this composition we are able to interiorize others, 
be an object to ourself, achieve meaning, to address our 
self anew and respond. 
As this composition is arranged harmoniously within a 
dialectical exchange with others, we smoothly grow and de¬ 
velop in interacts with others. Conversely, if this 
composition becomes troublesome, incongruent, and non- 
adaptive within, the organization of consciousness disinter- 
grates and the ecology of self becomes problematic and 
imbalanced. 
Summary 
We have described consciousness as a dialetical com 
position of address and response with others. From an 
entirely different perspective, this process of action 
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construction and induction into a world of shared meaning 
has, in a very limited way, been acknowledged in the psycho¬ 
analytic tradition. In the next chapter, we turn to these 
two theories in order to expose similar thinking in support 
of our proposition and be less abstract. 
CHAPTER III 
EARLY MEANING 
In an attempt to understand the experience of a neonate 
as it enters a dialectic world of consciousness, we turn to 
two theories that broke new ground in the psychoanalytic 
tradition. This tradition is saturated both in theory and 
therapy with the intra-physic, non-social, instinctual 
drives paradigm. For some theorists this view appeared too 
static and fatalistic and was contrary and inconsistent with 
their experiences as therapists. As a result, some gradual 
shifts around theoretical limits began to occur. These 
shifts were not only in areas of refinement but also more 
radical by abandonment of some basic Freudian cornerstones. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to trace the history of 
these theory shifts. We include the theories of Inter¬ 
personal Psychiatry (Harry Stack Sullivan, 1953) and Object 
Relations (Klein, 1975; Fairbairn, 1952; Winnicott, 1964; 
Guntrip, 1971) as they very closely parallel what has been 
stated so far and help to provide a detailed view of the 
infant's entrance into symbolic reality. 
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Harry Stack Sullivan 
From the moment of birth, survival depends upon the 
adequacy of interpersonal relationships. Sullivan is often 
quoted regarding the condition of the infant as an extra¬ 
ordinary plastic, germinal nucleus with infinite 
potentialities and with limited physical capacity and few 
automatic behaviors for dealing directly with its environ¬ 
ment (Rychlak, 1973) . Water, warmth, milk upon which the 
infant's life depends comes from others. Sullivan (1953) 
claims that there is at birth a raw, intense, basic survival 
drive expressed psychologically in a primal anxiety around 
the fear of abandonment. This anxiety is dealt with by the 
mothering one in interpersonal, social responses. 
Rudimentary Objectifications. Sullivan (1953) contends that 
the infant is entirely joined at birth, yet vaguely feels or 
"prehends" things. Since there is no ego in any distinctive 
sense, there is no awareness as a separate entity. For 
Sullivan, the experience of moving from this undifferent¬ 
iated condition is developmentally tripartite. The pro- 
totaxic, or oceanic, is the most primitive mode where the 
infant is undifferentiated for its environment. There is 
"prehension," a vague relief of distress or tension around 
the impulse to survive. The second mode, parataxic, 
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describes increased "prehensions" and the beginning capacity 
to discriminate from the rest of the world without any 
logical movement of thought. Objects such as the breast or 
the mother's face, upon repeated presentations become 
vaguely meaningful objects of "me/not me" categories. With 
limited but repeated encounters around its impulses, an 
"impression" from object constancy is formed, and the infant 
will "note" things-more-me, things-less-me. 
Within the context of infant impulses and the response 
received, objects such as the breast, face, its activity, 
begin to take on meaning. As this occurs and is repeated 
the infant begins to vaguely anticipate the completion of 
its action as it moves. With the ability to hold both its 
activity and response received, the infant begins to con¬ 
struct his reality. The third mode, syntactic, emerges with 
the capacity for language skills. Through gestures and 
words the child learns to more clearly anticipate the 
response of others as meaning becomes a mutual agreement 
(Mullahy, 1967). 
Objects and Response. Sullivan describes the self as a 
system of personifications, and with infancy "prehensions" 
as a basis, there gradually emerges three personifications 
of "me." 
"Personification refers to a complex, 
organized, cognitive template or 
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pattern of a particular person...it is 
constructed out of experiences, largely 
in the parataxic mode, derived from the 
interacting with other persons" 
(Carson, 1969; 29). 
The "good me" is based on appraisal, tenderness, and 
general good feeling. The "bad me" emerges from increasing 
anxiety status. The "not me" belongs to the most poorly 
grasped aspects of living and refers to experiences like 
horror, dread, loathing, etc. A sense of self begins 
through these rudimentary objectifications of me/not me. 
This dynamism with others is there from the start: "These 
facilitations and deprivations of important others are the 
source of self providing a form and direction maintained 
through life" (Sullivan, 1953; 45). The primary certain 
other in this dynamism is the mothering one. In the course 
of interacting with the mothering person, two personifica¬ 
tions emerge. The good-mother is constructed from 
experiences of relief and pleasure; the bad-mother arises 
from experiences of anxiety undergone in the presence of the 
mothering one. The experiences with the mothering one 
begins to yield the special object "me." 
Within this increasing process of the infant's prehen¬ 
sion or reactive gestures and the response of others, 
fundamental construction of activity arises, and meanings 
emerge, and become more conventional in language due to 
interaction. As the infant continues to interact, he 
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becomes internally differentiated according to the responses 
received. Within this social process the organization and 
development of the infant's construction of reality unfolds. 
In structuring his stages of personification Sullivan 
constantly reminds us of the primal anxiety of being 
abandoned. So powerful is this anxiety, or avoidance of it, 
that in developmental stages it is the fear of rejection and 
social disapproval from others; and perhaps beyond our 
understanding (Leary, 1957). In being human we are never 
free from interpersonal tension; what we do or think is 
related to others (Carson, 1969). 
The Interpersonal theory represents the process of 
early meaning, reflexion to reflection, as a social dynamic; 
that is, prehension (reaction to physical stimulation and 
relief from others) with increasing and gathering repetition 
emerge rudimentary objectifications of "me/not me" categor¬ 
ies, which are the basis to constructing activity and 
prerequisite to language skills. With this as a backdrop, 
we turn now to another theory to examine in more detail the 
infant's entrance into symbolic reality, especially the 
significance of becoming an object in what Sullivan labels 
the parataxic and protataxic modes. 
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Object Relations Theory 
Melanie Klein, the innovator of this psychoanalytic 
shift, departed form Freud's view of a fixed oral, anal, and 
phallic timetable of biological stages. Pressed by her 
practice and study of the fantasy life of children, she 
developed a new schema known as "ego-splitting" to reflect 
the quality of ego experiences in object relations (Arieti, 
1969) . The object world of the infant begins with the 
mother and the infant develops two basic positions toward 
this first object. As the infant begins to differentiate it 
does so internally on the basis of good and bad experiences 
of object relations. Good object experience promotes good 
ego development; bad experiences become undigested foreign 
bodies within the psyche (Klein, 1975). Ego splitting is 
consistent with Klein's larger world view that each of us is 
innately split by a life-death instinct (Guntrip, 1971). 
This mega-drama then is projected onto the outer world 
as the infant encounters objects and categorizes experiences 
from its own internal terror of its threatening death 
instinct. The first position, paranoid-schizoid, is pro¬ 
jected onto the breast, then reintrojected, so the 
experiences of the outer world merely magnify its innate 
impressions. Loving and content when satisfied, hating and 
fearful when frustrated, the infant becomes ambivalent and 
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expresses this in the form of splitting. Because of the 
infant s undifferentiated condition, these positions are 
internal; and therefore the infant may feel alternately 
supported as well as attacked from within. "There is a 
benign or vicious spiral leading to increasing well being, 
or an increasing sense of persecution... the second arouses 
further splitting as a defense and a seed of dis-integration 
is planted (Arieti, 1966; 227-228). 
Sometime in the second quarter of the first year Klein 
describes the beginning of the "depressive position" (Klein, 
1975). The infant is able to enter more fully into whole- 
object relationships, only to be exposed to guilt and 
depression over the discovery that it can hurt those he has 
become capable of loving. Infant survival shifts as there 
is a sense of its own destructive impulses and fears it may 
destroy the good breast. These are not independent, clear 
cut successive stages but rather overlap and oscillate. 
Neither are they transitional stages through which the 
infant passes and grows out of and leaves behind. For 
Klein, they are the two major positions in which the infant 
works out its relationship with the object world. 
Although Fairbairn rejected Klein's allegiance to Freud 
and the Eros/Thanatos war, he endorsed and further developed 
the concept of ego-splitting. Fairbairn agrees that there 
is emergence with the primary object, mother; yet mothers 
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are not perfect creatures (Guntrip, 1971). They do not 
always respond to the neonate in the most satisfying way. 
For Fairbairn the neonate starts life in wholeness, and it 
will remain so if protected long enough by good object 
relationships in its dealings with the outer world. Good 
object experience leads to good ego development. Proof of 
this is the fact that there are people who have had "good 
enough mothering" and have grown up with adequately stable 
and mature personalities. But perfection is impossible, and 
the infant soon encounters unsatisfying parental experi¬ 
ences. It is the bad-object mother in real life who is 
first internalized in an effort to control her (Guntrip, 
1971). Since the mothering one may be unsatisfying, but not 
all bad; she is split internally into good/bad mother. 
There are two fundamental experiences for the infant, 
satisfying/dissatisfying or good and bad. Since there is an 
undifferentiated condition, the primary object, mother, is 
split internally. The good mother is usually projected back 
into the real external mother who then is idealized so as to 
make real life relations as comfortable as possible. The 
good object serves as a protection against the bad object 
externally, but internally the bad object is a threat to the 
good Object because of the hate and confusion aroused. And 
so an Internal situation of fear of harming the good object 
results with feelings of guilt and depression (Guntrip, 
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1971) . 
Fairbairn's (1952) view of splitting develops in the 
following way. The infant is satisfied/dissatisfied by its 
primary object, mother. When dissatisfying, there is a bad 
object experience which itself is split into an exciting or 
rejecting object as the infant's reactive/impulse needs are 
unmet. This struggle to cope with wholeness in real life 
experiences is split by the tantalizing mother who excites 
needs without satisfying them (the exciting object), by the 
authoritarian, angry mother who denies satisfaction (the 
rejecting object), and by the idealized mother whom the 
child seeks, and needs are avoided to spare her displeasure 
in the hope of minimal approval (the ideal object). 
Dialectic Origin. As the encounter with objects are repeat¬ 
ed and increased, the infant begins in a very rudimentary 
way to gather its experiences into "me/not me" objectifica¬ 
tions as described by Sullivan. These very primary 
constructions, however, come and go. On the one hand the 
infant is frequently in a condition of "primary identifica¬ 
tion" or unbrokeness with the mother. While on the other 
hand the infant returns to a more dialectic mode as required 
by the implosion to act (Winnicott, 1964). Because of 
physiological needs and growth, the infant spends increas¬ 
ingly more time in the active mode, gathers together more 
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and more encounters with objects, and in turn is capable of 
more complicated ways of acting. Critical here is that 
while fluctuating between the two modes of primary identif¬ 
ication and increasing dialectic action construction, the 
condition of primary identification unfolds, and also 
becomes an object. The infant, therefore, can act toward 
the experience of inaction or "euphoria" by virtue of its 
internal representation of it (Winnicott, 1964). 
Bonding and Integration. This process of differentiation, 
when the infant begins to gather experiences of its activity 
and meaning of me/not me, good/bad, is a delicate time. As 
Sullivan states a sense of terror can be felt if this 
process of becoming reflective is not smoothly achieved. 
This period of bonding is more than physical holding; it is 
a depth form of communication and nuturance. The signifi¬ 
cance of breast feeding, for example, lies less in the 
chemical value of the mother's milk than in the cutaneous 
stimulation provided by the accompanying contact (Pearce, 
1977). Ashley Montagu (1978) gathered overwhelming evidence 
to show that a healthy life is not possible without bonding 
during the first few years and especially the first few 
months. It is a time when interactions multiply quickly and 
infant modes can be misinterpreted and intruded upon 
(Fairbairn, 1952). Such response from others may threaten 
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the very experience of existence. 
Imagine the infant crying and flailing about as an act 
for relief from a fever or soiled diapers. The mothering 
one misreads this and takes the infant to her breast and 
reactive sucking ensues. The experience of intiial con¬ 
structed action is disrupted. The infant's rudimentary 
dialectic consciousness, those objects more or less related 
to me, is devastated. The action construction becomes 
confusing, disorientated, fearful, and the result is ambiv¬ 
alence (Klein, 1975), As primitive as these kinds of action 
constructions are by adult standards, if repeated the infant 
will return and remain as much as possible in the state of 
primary identification in which it cannot be intruded upon. 
Action construction, becoming an object to itself, then 
becomes tentative for the infant. Although ambivalent, 
confused, fearful, the infant can not forfeit the dialectic 
mode and return exclusively to primary identification. To 
do so, the infant would lose any ability to gain a sense of 
being and control over its activity and anxiety. It is this 
ambivalence the Klein referred to as the "paranoid-schizoid 
position" . 
As the infant physiologically matures and repetition 
and increased acts occur and are gathered together, differ¬ 
entiation of meaning structure arise. Splitting is not of 
some already existing whole, but represents categories of 
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experiences in the process of development in a symbolic 
world (Guntrip, 1971). The degree of confusion in encoun¬ 
tering experiences, especially as activity becomes more 
complex, will effect how the infant progresses in internal¬ 
izing the relation to things less me/more me and good/bad 
experiences. As these categories of experience increase, so 
does the ability to internally construct more complex action 
be it toward satisfaction or dissatisfaction. As it is 
increasingly more adverse or dissatisfying, the infant can 
form objectifications of "me" more toward its action in 
relation to primary identification than toward others. The 
effects of this disruption is what Fairbairn references as 
the "withdrawn ego" (1952). 
Unintegrated, Unconscious. When the entrance into the 
symbolic world of interaction with others becomes too 
threatening, the infant retreats away from them in its ways 
of acting. The cluster of experiences may well be sensed as 
simply good or bad, instead of coalescing as an interaction 
with good and bad features. Dialectic withdrawal or re¬ 
ducing the number of overt communicative gestures that 
require response from others is safer, less confusing and 
less painful. Having developed this "inner forum" the 
infant will begin and continue to construct its action and 
create its reality in more private, restricted, less 
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socialized ways. 
The consequences of this dialectic withdrawal are 
significant. Experiences will collect around a private 
"me," and the. normal integration with others will be 
thwarted. Movement toward action construction will be away 
from others and control of its environment will diminish. 
Differentiation occurs through integration of object exper¬ 
iences, and as they become more incremental so in turn do 
more complex ways of acting increase, and the child gains 
more reflective ability. Yet more complicated ways of being 
"ambivalent" may also occur, and the infant can hide his 
action construction toward others. Given that this "inner 
forum" is achieved with others, then what is hidden from 
them may be hidden from the infant. What is hidden then 
remains unintegrated in the otherwise normal process of a 
socially created reality. While it is from the integration 
of object experiences that differentiation arises and more 
and more awareness develops, this deeply private retreat to 
safe unbrokenness is outside the developing ability to be 
aware of being aware. 
The overwhelming effect of this dialectical withdrawal 
is referred to by Pierce (1974) as "pseudo-reality construc¬ 
tion." From a defensive maneuver to protect the "good in 
the face of adverse encounters with objects, private, 
structures are created, yet are unconventional meaning 
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unintegrated in a world of shared reality (Arieti, 1966). 
These private, idiosyncratic ways of activity remain avail¬ 
able and to some extent determine ways in which individuals 
act toward their world, while at the same time are incompat¬ 
ible with reality that is being formed in dialectic 
composition. These unconscious meaning structures, although 
available to action construction, are inaccessible to 
reflectivety. 
Summary 
We have developed a model of consciousness as a process 
of action construction and described neonatal movement into 
symbolic reality as interactively available in integration 
or as defensively inaccessible in cloistered unconscious. 
We incorporated the theories of Interpersonal Psychiatry and 
Object Realtions to strengthen and augment our position of 
consciousness as a dialectic composition, as well as to 
account for the unconscious. Although these two schools 
widen the scope of psychoanalysis, we do not subscribe to 
the broader hominculus concept of an ego entity. As we 
described the foundations in earlier chapters, our model 
addresses man as one who can act as an agent. The 
conceptual commitment to id-ego-super ego and instinctual 
derivatives as separate psychic structures, as well as the 
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completion of ego development in the early years and 
singular dependence on the mother-child relationship, are 
too deterministic and contrary to our view of agentry. The 
Symbolic Interactionist position refrains from any discus¬ 
sion of human action outside the pale of the experiencing 
and acting person. Psycho structural nominations add 
nothing to our understanding of impulse, which in concert 
with the interaction of others would more paradigmatically 
be described as "fundamental anthropological constants" 
(Berger & Luckman, 1966). 
In order to examine this further, we turn to the fields 
of philosophy and anthropology. 
CHAPTER I V 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
WhethGr a theory is formulated from clinical inconsis¬ 
tencies, research analysis, or is initiated on assumptive 
truisms, it ultimately rests upon some philosophical 
moorings. Normally a synthesis of ideas, convictions, 
fundamental judgments are gathered and achieve some basic 
employable concepts, assumptions, and principles. 
Additionally, the more a theory of a particular discipline 
stands in valid harmony with facts and conclusions from 
other disciplines, the more pertinent, acceptable, and long 
standing it becomes. From our vantage point in this study 
such association appears logical, and accounts for our 
inclusion of findings from philosophy and anthropology. Our 
examination for such common ground is a pursuit in a 
synergetic spirit, to prevent our isolation from other 
scientific fields and to compliment what we say in our hope 
of being harmoniously contextualized within these other 
fields. In so doing we look to break the uselessness of 
disciplinary separation and to be mutually vitalized, as 
well as search for insight and consistency in the integra¬ 
tion of such knowledge as it converges. 
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Philosophy^ Martin Buber 
Buber's thought is of particular interest to this study 
because as a technician he constantly monitored his proposi¬ 
tion on the concreteness of peoples' experience and how to 
understand that experience. He claimed this kept him on the 
track of the "real questions" rather than philosophical 
problems, and engaged the total person rather than the 
intellectual alone. He felt these "real questions" arise 
from our self awareness, and to ask them is part of being 
human, and reflection on them the function of philosophy. 
He investigated the "role of man" within his/her environ¬ 
ment, as a social being, and found individuals to have 
enormous energy around relations, which Buber came to call 
"the central clue to the meaning of existence: (Buber, 
1958) . 
Buber accepted the proposition that in order to under¬ 
stand people it was necessary to look within them to their 
motives, desires, interests, and goals, as well as to their 
external activities. The latter were mere manifestations of 
what already existed within, the first being prior to or 
synomous with the second. Buber concluded that individuals 
form birth to death were energized physiologically and 
psychologically to belong. For Buber, the very essence of 
existence was this "belongingness" that was constantly being 
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borne out by an individual's fundamental activity throughout 
life, address and answer. Human beings are fundamentally 
engaged in birth, search primarily for connectedness 
throughout life, and deeply achieve unity in death (Buber, 
1958) . 
Two Attitudes. His well known work, I and Thou (1958) orig¬ 
inally published in 1923, represents his position in regard 
to the relation of individual to individual; one derived as 
to what is human from experience rather than abstract 
thought. Although the complexities of his thought progress¬ 
ion leads us to a spiritual level we do not wish to pursue 
here, his philosophy-of-dialogue contains some very 
pragmatic messages for our use in a narrow discussion of the 
self. 
Buber's approach to humanity is experiential: acting, 
knowing, feeling. The individual is social, situational, an 
actor, and this is a constant of the human condition. To be 
relational is nothing less, than organic mentality and 
behavior. It is the human motivation; it is what each looks 
for and how each is renewed. This could be established from 
the behavioral examination of individual acts, and pinpoints 
what was truly real and accounts for why each did what 
he/she did. 
Buber's classic work, I and Thou, begins with the 
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declaration; "to man the world is two-fold, in accordance 
with his attitude" (1958; 3). Attitude means a fundamental 
posture, a way of setting oneself toward the world. Malcolm 
Diamond translates Buber; "Attitude is a position, the fun¬ 
damental posture toward the world and any of the beings one 
meets within it" (1960; 20). Buber claims these postures 
are relational and calls them, I-Thou and I-It. These are 
not rigid compartmental positions each fits into but rather 
modes or ways of acting of personal existence that are 
alternately in all of us. 
Maurice Friedman discusses the concept of I-Thou in his 
introduction to his translation of collection of Buber's 
lectures and essays; 
"I-Thou is the primary world of rela¬ 
tionship. It is characterized by 
mutuality, directedness, presentness, 
intensity, and ineffability. Although 
it is only within this relation that 
personality and the personal reality 
exist, the thou of I-Thou is not 
limited to men, but may include 
animals, trees, objects of nature, and 
God. I-It is the primary word of 
experiencing and using. It takes place 
within man, not between him and the 
world. Hence it is entirely sub¬ 
jective, lacking in mutuality...the It 
of I-It may equally well be a he, a 
she, an animal a thing, a spirit, or 
even a god, without change in the 
primary word. Thus I-Thou and I-It cut 
across the lines of our ordinary dis¬ 
tinctions to focus our attention not 
upon individual objects and their 
casual connections, but upon relations 
between things, the dazwischen ("there 
in between"). Experiencing is I-It 
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whether it is the experiencing of an 
object or of a man, whether it is 
inner, or outer...Man can live securely 
in the world of It, but if he lives 
only in this world he is not a man" 
(1965; 12-13). 
Address and Answer. Each then is immediatley polar, i.e., 
mutually placed by their very existence. "There are not two 
kinds of man, but two poles in humanity" (Buber, 1965). 
Werner Manheim says of Buber that "he defines man's role in 
the recognition of a 'fluidum' emanating from the very 
essence of being" (1974; 20). The I of the I-It differs 
from the I of I-Thou. The I-It mode is one that distances 
objects, allows us to set ourselves over and against them, 
by which we measure, hold back, arrange, and control them. 
It is the way to achieve a perspective as objects are use- 
able, pliable, and manipulable. This is never the case 
within the I-Thou mode, where the meaning of our existence 
is disclosed in mutual communication, and in this mutuality, 
understanding and affirmation occur. This is a special 
integrative dynamic that unites and at the same time expands 
the I. This integration occurs through interiorizing the 
other in the process of communication—address and answer. 
Yet the I-It is not to be interpreted as a negative. The It 
is necessary for each to acquire a perspective on the world; 
it is how things are regarded as objects (Buber, 1958). 
Although each human being is placed relationally and the 
most fundamental desire and need is for human (and Divine) 
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dialogue, Buber asserts this dialolgue is not intrinsic to 
humanity. What is intrinsic is the activity, the movement 
toward; dialogue is the purpose and goal of existence. He 
expands on this construction of activity and the notion that 
man is polar-placed by introducing the concept of "orienta¬ 
tion" and "realization." We turn again to Manheim for 
clarity: 
"For Buber 'orientation' and 'reali¬ 
zation' are polar means of expressing 
the experiences that come to us. 
'Orientation' means man is born with a 
readiness to be exposed to experience. 
'Realization' means the workability of 
the event itself that stimulates man's 
creativity. These have to coupled. 
'Realization' becomes the first hint of 
'It.' To make an object. It, a part of 
man's encounter, he needs 
'orientation'" (1974; 21-22). 
Because dialogue is not intrinsic, people clearly are not 
passive or spectators, but an energetic actors in the on¬ 
going drama of creating their self. Man is in complete and 
seeks out over time and space connectedness (Buber, 1958). 
As each enters this dialogue, it points the way to more, and 
so becomes directional within the same moment. In other 
words, as we keep becoming more deeply 'oriented,' we also 
are arranging ourselves for continuous 'realization' (Buber, 
1958) . 
Buber insists this communication takes place in 
concrete every day experiences, and there is no need to 
struggle with elusive or mystical notions. It has nothing 
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to do with being gifted, intellectual activity, vocabulary, 
or any system or program (Manheim, 1974). Experience comes 
to us, squeezed by a past and a future; the experience is 
fitted; the result is called by each the truth; this is the 
process of dialogue. He refers to this communicative 
process as affirmation, and that in this process meaning is 
achieved. The important point is that the presence of 
others becomes the bearer of meaning, and out of relation¬ 
ships comes the meaning of self. The origin of all human 
development is critical contact with others (Buber, 1958). 
Without the 'Thou,' the '!' is impossible, and the discovery 
of 'Thou' brings about the consciousness of '!.' The '!' 
takes possession of itself in the other. Personal reality 
and personality emerge due to relations. 
Buber concludes that our being relational by nature is 
so intense, so pervasive, that there really is no simple 
For Buber, man (self) by virtue of his very existence 
is an interpersonal structure (I-Thou), " a shared living 
center" where we are reciprocal to one another which in time 
and space man prefers to call '!.' 
In his essay. What is Common to All, (1965) Buber 
elaborates on his notion of a shared living center as a 
process of that which takes place between man and man in his 
experiences. This living center evolves through the process 
of 'betweeness' which is common to all. For a host of 
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reasons, known or unknown, this normal process can be frozen 
and the spiral of the developing living center can be locked 
the attentiveness to address and answer is severely 
weakened. The expansion of is interrupted, personal 
growth is shunted, as the living continuously renewed 
relational process freezes into an It-world. Buber expands 
on this dialogic foundation, what is common to all, and 
develops the concept of the Essential We, which is an 
eternal Thou with the 'Between' of things being a Divine 
Energy. For Buber, individual activity for connectedness 
becomes transcendent and moves to completion in the Eternal 
Center. Although Buber's expansion from very experiential 
object relationalism to connectedness with the Living Center 
serves this author well in his personal life, it is beyond 
the scope of this study. 
Summary. According to Buber what each individual has in 
common is the activity to move toward connectedness which 
takes place in experiences of dialogic process. It is in 
and because of this process that the consciousness of 'I' 
emerges. Although this dialogic process can be frozen and 
personal growth interrupted, it is a continuous one through¬ 
out life neither age-bound nor other-limited. Each indivi¬ 
dual is unique based upon relationships out of which I 
emerges. Philosophically then we conclude from the study of 
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Buber that only in convergence with others does the 'I' 
crystallize and take possession of itself and this occurs in 
the process of interiorizing others in the encounter of 
address and answer. Buber's claim is that this process is 
common to all. To gather more insight into these referenced 
"anthropological constants", we turn now to Teilhard de 
Chardin. 
Anthropology, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin 
Irrespective of how one proceeds to conclude how a self 
is acquired, it is safe to assume, that strictly speaking, 
the neonate arrives in this world without possession of a 
true self. There is little argument that it arrives physi¬ 
ologically pre-adapted for a specific physical environment- 
oxygen, food, range of temperature, etc.-and with functional 
equipment proclived to such an environment outside of which 
it cannot survive. In general there is also agreement that 
the infant arrives holistically pre-adapted for this 
environment, not compartmentalized. That is, survival is 
not exclusive to the physical dimension alone, but as the 
studies on marasmus have demonstrated, it is psychlogical as 
well. Additionally, as we stated in Chapter III, there is 
consensus that there is one undifferentiated reality in 
terms of neonate experience. The most fundamental basic 
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line of survival of infant life is its intense dependence 
and profound relation to others. So profound that without 
it there is no survival; so intense that there is exper- 
iencially only one reality. Biological and psychological 
survival is an intensely relational phenomenon. Without 
this active engagement in connectedness from the very start, 
there is merely de-composition, or entropy. 
Life from Synthesis. Indeed, the very beginning of human 
life, of any life form emerges from a combination of 
elements that produces something greater than either of the 
elements or their sum. Human life consistently rests on the 
fact that it emerges from the womb begun with the joining of 
sperm and egg. The very first step is a coming together, a 
convergence of elements, in which a critical transition 
occurs, a mutation shift from two separate deeply attracted 
elements to a new single form emergence. Synergistically 
then the threshold of human life has been crossed to a new 
complexity. As these two elements meet, engage, and 
maturate together a critical moment arrives in this integra¬ 
tive process and human life appears. There is no confusion 
or ambiguity here. The physical life form appears as an 
integrative process initially begun from the joining of the 
sperm and egg. The physical life form begins as a result of 
material joining. It is quite simply in origin defined this 
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way, i.e., from a unit of elements a distinct, different, 
new form emerges. 
Anthropology and paleontology have clearly demonstrated 
this to be true in the history of the earth. In all living 
organisms life is seen as a continuous uninterrupted flow of 
events and changing conditions, a sphere of maturation in 
which higher life forms appear and develop to continuously 
high degrees of complexity. 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) has been widely 
acclaimed as one of the most creative and influential 
thinkers of our century. He was a world renown biologist, 
paleontologist anthropologist, and Jesuit priest censured by 
the church and forbidden to publish during his lifetime. 
(All his works were published posthumously.) As part of the 
research for the best seller. The Aquarian Conspiracy, 
Personal and Social Transformation in the 1980's, Marilyn 
Ferguson sent 210 questionnaires throughout the country to 
leaders engaged in social transformation in many different 
areas. Respondents were asked to name individuals whose 
ideas had most influenced them, either through personal con¬ 
tact or their writings; the name most given in frequency and 
importance was Pierre Tielhard de Chardin (Ferguson, 1980). 
Teilhard very carefully weaves an intricate and complex 
pattern regarding the evolution of humanity. In his primary 
work. The Phenomenon of Man (1959), he claims in the 
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beginning at point Alpha, when the big bang occurred, there 
was at the same moment a profound event emerging, the birth 
of consciousness. Consciousness, like a seed to a shoot, 
grew and manifested itself within the movement of evolution. 
This appearance occurred by way of a quantum leap in the 
physiological. The phylums of life (distinct stages) are 
dynamic and developmental because they are impelled. Con¬ 
sciousness sets evolution in motion toward point 'Omega'. 
For Teilhard the history of our planet appears as a 
continuous uninterrupted flow of events and changing condi¬ 
tions. In a very broad way the history of the earth has 
three distinguishable stages. One is when the earth's crust 
solidified after a process of cooling down. The second 
period begins when life first emerges and various forms 
gradually unfold. The earth was covered with plant life and 
populated with an infinite variety of changing life forms. 
With the third stage a new phenomenon made its entry, the 
dimension of the mind. Teilhard refers to these stages as 
the geosphere, the biosphere, and the noosphere. As he 
viewed it, the beginnings of life are an outcome of a kind 
of maturation process in matter. 
"In every domain, where anything exceeds 
a certain measurement, it suddenly 
changes its aspect, condition, or 
nature. The curve doubles back, the 
surface contracts to a point, the solid 
disintegrates, the liquid boils, the 
germ cell divides, intuition suddenly 
burst on the piled up facts...critical 
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points have been reached, rungs on the 
ladder, involving a change of state" 
(1959; 78). 
Thus the emergence of life is to be seen as a critical 
moment, a phase mutation in the history of the earth, 
comparable only with the coming into existence of the atoms 
themselves from the sub-atomic or pre-atomic elements. 
Much later, when life had gradually developed and had 
reached a high degree of complexity, an equally critical 
phase mutation was to occur once more in the process of 
evolution. After matter had been vitalized, life was to be 
'hominized,' the entry of humankind. (Teilhard uses new 
words and new word combinations to signify his concepts. 
Hominization refers to the process and events taking place 
in the world of nature as a consequence of human 
reflection.) Man's arrival is intimately linked with the 
rest of the cosmos. 
For Teilhard life arose in the womb of matter, and this 
life "fanned out" into ever more complex forms. Evolution, 
for Teilhard, is not disorderly chaos, but a gradual ascent 
set irreversibly in one direction. It moves in the dir¬ 
ection of what is more complex. It proceeds from the simple 
to more intricate structures, from elementary particles to 
atoms to molecules, to cells, to pluricelluar creatures, to 
more complex organisms ending up with the most complex 
entity, man. Yet increasing complexity does not mean in the 
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passage of time life forms become equipped with more and 
more intricate mechanical capacity, but rather they exhibit 
a greater richness of internal organization and in their 
structure an ever greater degree of intrinsic unity and 
concentration (Teilhard, 1959). Teilhard calls this process 
"interiorization" or "involution" (1959). As Julian Huxley 
explains in his introduction to The Phenomenon of Man; "In 
this way organized entities emerge held together by their 
own energy and each of them forming a self-contained 
equilibria! system" (1959; 19). 
Complexity-Consciousness. Although Teilhard's language and 
construction are new, his thoughts on complexity are not, 
most scientists in a variety of fields have independently 
confirmed this position. Teilhard was unique in positing 
that with this increasing complexity running parallel is a 
second distinguishing feature of evolution, an orientation 
toward consciousness. He states evolution reveals several 
laws of nature; most famous is his Law of Complexity/Con¬ 
sciousness . 
Throughout the long evolutive process there is evidence 
of a gradual growth of consciousness. He claims this is 
supported by the steady advance of the nervous system, which 
reaches its perfection in man. For Teilhard the course of 
animal evolution as a whole clearly evidences a gradual 
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refining and extension of the nervous system, especially the 
brain. In the study of cerebralization, the proportional 
development of the brain vis-a-vis the whole organism, there 
are two observable phenomenon, increasing complexity and 
ascending psychism. Fritjof Capra (1982) details how the 
scientific community is increasingly endorsing Teilhard's 
construct that increasing complexity and expanding con¬ 
sciousness always occur together. Neurophysiologist P. 
Chauchard comments: 
"Teilhard must be understood in this 
way, that each and every degree of 
consciousness always presupposes an 
equivalent degree of organic 
complexity, of interior unity and con¬ 
centration. Without such organic 
complexity, psychic life is not pos¬ 
sible; and the higher the form of 
psychic life, the greater the 
integrated unity and complexity of the 
organism has to be. All of this is 
completely in line with modern neuro¬ 
physiology, which has quite clearly 
demonstrated that the degree of 
psychism and consciousness is always 
conditioned by the degree to which a 
given organism has an integrated unity" 
(1965; 84). 
Teilhard continuously asserts that the 'stuff of the 
universe’ is twofold. An exterior, or a "without of 
things", that relates only to the observable connections and 
dimension of material things; and an interior, a "within of 
things", which is co-extensive with the exterior and in some 
degree present in them all. "Consciousness is no longer to 
be confined to the highest forms of life and be treated as a 
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marginal phenomenon of limited significance" (1959; 55). To 
avoid treating consciousness as an epiphenomenon restricted 
only to higher life forms, Teilhard suggests that all living 
membranes of the biosphere share a form of consciousness as 
a corollary to their complexity. He defines consciousness 
in a very broad way as "every kind of psychism, from the 
most rudimentary forms to interior perception imaginable to 
the human phenomenon of reflective thought" (1959; 57). 
This interiority, or within of things, which we 
perceive clearly enough in ourselves, is in a different but 
equally real way undeniably present in the biosphere. 
However, Teilhard is not an advocate of pan-psychism, i.e., 
that there is one and the same consciousness present in all 
things. Nor is he espousing that consciousness as we human 
beings experience this 'within' as reflective, is in some 
miniature form possessed by biospheric life. 
"The physical make up of an insect is 
not and cannot be that of a vertebrate; 
this in virtue of the position of each 
on the tree of life... the mind of a 
dog, despite all that may be said to 
the contrary, is positively superior to 
that of a mole or fish" (1959; 167). 
Consciousness is a gradation and clearly within the 
animal kingdom and in itself an ascending system. For 
Teilhard between the consciousness of the most highly 
developed animal and the reflective consciousness of man 
there occurred a critical phase shift; life attained a 
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higher stage and assumed a new dimension. With roots buried 
in the history of the animal kingdom, man (reflective 
consciousness) is an altogether new phenomenon. And so for 
Teilhard, if we wish to arrive at a coherent picture of the 
universe based on the hard data of science, we need to 
accept that in varying degrees all creatures posses a 
certain interiority. 
Tangential and Radial Energy. Using Teilhard, we have 
viewed the phylogenetic scale as an evolutionary stream 
moving toward more and more complexity/consciousness. He 
discusses this more in detail by framing the additional 'law 
of convergence'. For Teilhard a higher phylum grows and 
arises from a lower phylum. Each phylogenetic appearance 
represents a critical shift to something new, higher, more 
complex; a threshold crossing of such impact that something 
entirely new takes place and is formed. This happens as an 
organism moves to become more strongly centered, enriched, 
and so exhibits more extensive 'complex ification ' . For 
Teilhard that movement is twofold energy: 
"Tangential which links the elements 
with all others of the same order as 
itself, and radial which draws it 
toward greater complexity and 
centricity, or forward" (1959; 64-65). 
Tangential corresponds to the 'without of things, 
binds members of a group together, causes living forms to 
It is the cohesive force in the phylum. fan out. 
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spreading out until the final stage of a particular phylum 
is reached; so it is exploring, arranging, binding. it is 
centrifugal. Radial energy draws forward to greater cen- 
ti^icity, occurs simultaneously and is centripetal. For 
Teilhard life and energy, indeed matter and energy, are the 
same. It is a process of energy that moves a phylum to a 
particular point of a new threshold and over to a new level, 
due to the expanding, growing, arranging, combining dynamic. 
Evolution demonstrates the principle movement of 
reality in synthesis, what Teilhard refers to as the law of 
recurrence (1962) . In human beings the experience of re¬ 
flective consciousness (self) emerges into personality (I). 
"We see in the progression of complex 
forms a further degree of unification 
being accompanied by an inner con¬ 
sciousness, by means of increasingly 
organized elements there emerges the 
state of personality. The law of 
recurrence applies to analysis of our 
own personality. Man in what is termed 
spirit and matter is but two phases of 
the same reality. In the nature of 
things one is inseparable from the 
other, one is never without the other. 
This is the sequel to synthesis. Pure 
spirituality is an inconceivable as 
pure materiality. So every spirit 
derives its reality and nature from a 
particular type of synthesis. The 
psyche also meets at a critical point, 
also is the appearance of unity. The 
point of transformation is co¬ 
extensive. This unifying principle, 
spirit, or person (or whatever it is to 
be called) this reflecting 
consciousness so peculiar to man, does 
not constitute a being on its own. It 
can only appear in the exercise of the 
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act of union, that is to say, when 
acting on an object proportionate to 
itself" (1962; 59-60). 
The centricity of person does not defy synthesis. The 
law of convergency does not only appear in infra human life 
forms. "There is no mind without systhesis (1959; 161)." 
"The deepening of consciousness always unfolds in a shared 
relationship with others, it is indispensable social (1969; 
133)." Reflective consciousness occurs only through union; 
only in convergence does individuation take place. 
Summary. According to Teilhard all life forms emerge from a 
combination of elements, synthesis. With the appearance of 
man, there emerged a new level of life, because of the 
peculiar consciousness or power to be aware that we are 
aware. All life forms, all levels on the general phylogen¬ 
etic scale, appear due to synthesis, the combination of 
elements into some new form. Because it is reflective 
consciousness, the ability to say "I," the possession of a 
self that evidences the very stuff of the human phylum, it 
must, by the very nature of how life emerges, become so 
within a moment of convergency. The application for this 
study is that what occurs on any phylum level, also exists 
within any individual member of the phylum or as embryology 
terms the axiom: ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (Samples, 
1981) . 
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A Synthesis of Buber and Tielhard. How does such an 
excursion into the fields of philosophy and anthropology 
assist us in the study of the 'self? what evidences are 
there to draw on to form a more enlightened position on the 
question of the appearance of the 'self,' and how can our 
relational position be augmented? 
It is simply this. We wish to demonstrate in this 
study a position that is consistent and coherent with the 
evidences of other sciences. Specifically we are concerned 
with the emergence of the 'self, that unique possession of 
human life called reflective consciousness which places us 
on a radically different plateau from all other life forms. 
It appears to be precisely logical to inquiry into the 
history of the appearance of life forms on this planet 
scientifically sequenced and philosophically placed to learn 
of such emergence, and in our attempt, to posit a theory 
that is more easily confirmed. 
Initially, we began this study with a good degree of 
hesitation and on several occasions were tempted and nearly 
persuaded to turn back. In many ways our fears were no 
where more confirmed than in the study of Buber and 
Teilhard. Both are called mystics and poets by their 
critics, not only in their respective styles and insights, 
but where each lead us in their progressions. We choose 
them and endured with their writing because we felt strongly 
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it would help to place us squarely within a practical 
continuum of why and how the self emerges and develops. Our 
primary interest was to see what infomation and conclusions 
such an effort would yield in regard to the focus of our 
study. 
It appears to us that both Buber and Teilhard, from the 
different vantage points of distinct disciplines, arrived at 
very similar conclusions. Each in their own progression 
meet each other not only at the terminous point of their 
respective studies, but also mid-course in their individual 
developments. How do we relate their insights to each other 
and to our position of a relational self? When placed next 
to each other, we are delighted and encouraged by the 
obvious parrallelism that occurs. On the following page we 




Observations based on 
man's experience man 
is recognized outwardly 
in his activity and as 
having a within 
Observations based on history 
of the earth all life forms 
have a within of things and a 
without of things 
Man is 
polar 
immediatel y bi¬ 
Man is an active seeker 
Within man there are two 
attitudes 
Every life form is derived 
from synthesis 
Every phylum is totally 
active 
Energy has two components 
I-It 
I-Thou 
Orientation and realiza¬ 
tion 
Without of things 
Within of things 
Tangential and radial energy 
I-It measures, arranges 
I-Thou integrates, 
enriches 
Tangential energy fans out, 
arranges 




Dialogue is form giving 
directional 
Essence of existence is 
belongingness 
The is a shared cen¬ 
ter 




Energy is ascending and 
directional 
Principle movement of reality 
is synthesis 
The law of convergence 
Omega point, the apex of con¬ 
vergence 
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Each from their own starting point have redrawn the 
boundaries of their disciplines. While threading the fabric 
of their concepts of interrelated reality with an appro¬ 
priate language, each experienced difficulty being 
accommodated by their peers. Each searched for the basic 
principles of individuality and found them in integrative 
and relational structures, inherently dynamic and develop- 
mentally coherent and maturing through interdependent 
interaction. Their observations, insights, and conclusions 
achieve additional meaning when set within the larger 
pattern of the paradigm shift now to be examined. 
CHAPTER V 
A PARADIGM SHIFT 
The nodal point of our position is that the self 
emerges in union with others. It is the intent of this 
chapter to center on how this perspective of relationalism 
can be viewed as the central psychological dynamic in the 
exploration of human behavior. We wish to conclude that 
this relationalism is an essential phenomenon of human life, 
and therefore not a subordinate category within a 
hierarchial construct of viewing people and their behavior. 
Energy 
The concept of energy which receives such emphasis in 
the writing of Buber and Teilhard, although viewed dis¬ 
tinctly different, is not a new notion in the field of 
psychology. Psychoanalytic tradition references abstract 
psychological energy as forces and instinctual drives, 
especially sexual libido. Jung discusses "psychic energy , 
Reich's theory is built on "orgone energy" and most of us 
are familiar with the jargon of the more recent psycho¬ 
technologies such as "vital energy", bio-energy", etc. 
Freudians talk of emotional energy in pairs; drives and 
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defenses, active and reactive forces, libido and destrucdo, 
Eros and Thanatos. The impact of this vocabulary and the 
broader context, or paradigm, continues to be experienced in 
contemporary discussions of pent-up energies, inhibited 
forces, and ideas of separate entities. 
We claim our model of a relational self is being 
constructed within a paradigm shift. To appropriately high¬ 
light this it is important to discuss our use of the concept 
of energy within the context of the parpdigm shift known as 
"new physics". 
Gregory Bateson(1979) argues that relationships should 
be used as a basis for all definitions and should be taught 
to our children. Anything, he believed, should be defined 
not by what it is in itself, but by relations to other 
things. Subsequent to the discovery of quantum theory, the 
new physics viewed matter and particles-electrons, protons, 
and neutrons-as electromagnetic waves, movements, in trans¬ 
formation with interactive components. Atomic reality 
represents probabilities of interconnections with other 
systems (Bohm, 1980). In the sphere of atomic reality, 
there are not things but interconnections between things. 
"In quantum theory you never end up with things, you only 
deal with interconnections" (Capra, 1982; 85). Modern 
physics reveals the basic newness of the universe and shows 
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we cannot decompose the world into independently existing 
smallest units. "As we penetrate into matter, nature does 
not show us basic building blocks, but rather appears as a 
complicated web of relations" (Capra, 1982; 88). Samples 
(1981) refers to these discoveries from quantum theory and 
an interelated new way of viewing matter and objects as the 
stability of dynamic balance. 
Unlike the classical physics (of Newton) which empha¬ 
sized stability in the unchangeableness of independent 
tangible, solid objects as passive, static, entities; the 
new physics (of Einstein) claims stability of dynamic 
activity and inseparableness in continually changing pat¬ 
terns. What happens if we briefly apply this to Freudian 
concepts? 
The psychological structures on which Freud based his 
theory of personality-Id, Ego, Superego-are seen as some 
kind of internal objects, located in psychological space. 
Psychoanalysts have been viewed as surgeons probing into the 
psyche. Freud also discusses how the unconscious contains 
'matter' that has been forgotten or repressed. Id is 
discussed and carved upon as some entity and source of 
powerful drives that are in conflict with a system of 
inhibiting mechanisms residing in the superego. The ego is 
a frail entity located between these two powers and engaged 
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in continual existential struggle. These psychological 
structures then are viewed as having properties of material 
objects. For example, no two could occupy the same place, 
and so any portion of the psychological apparatus could 
expand only by displacing other parts. These concepts imply 
the notions of entities, cause and effect that, as Freud 
said, are uniquely determined in childhood. They are 
notions that are consistent with the larger paradigm of 
classical physics. 
Within the context of classical physics energy is 
viewed as a substance which flows through and is transferred 
between organisms. In the new physics it is a measure of 
activity, of dynamic patterns. It is associated with con¬ 
cepts of flow, vibrations, unfolding, rhythm, synchronicity, 
and resonance. It is not referred to as a substance, but as 
describing dynamic patterns of complex organizations. 
Quantum Theory has shown that subatomic particles are not 
isolated grains of matter but are probability patterns. 
This is difficult to understand in the reductive framework 
of the classical physics paradigm. Perhaps the physicist, 
Werner Heinsenberg, sums it best in his uncertainty 
principle which is applied in the measurement of subatomic 
particles. One cannot measure both the velocity and the 
position of an electron, because the energy required in 
making the measurements for one condition—the velocity 
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affect the electron's position, and vice versa (Capra, 
1982) . He expressed the limitations of the classical 
concepts in being applied to atomic phenomena. 
A good analogy may be the difference between a machine 
and an organism. Machines are constructed with well defined 
number of parts in a precise pre-established way. They 
function according to the linear chain of cause and effect, 
and breakdown is usually identified as a single cause. 
Organisms, however, grow (process oriented), show a high 
degree of internal flexibility (adaptation), and breakdown 
is perceived as non-linear multiple factors that may amplify 
each other through interdependent feedback loops (initial 
cause is not that critical). The analogy distinguishes one 
as an isolated, independent, passive, deterministic struc¬ 
ture; and the other as a dynamic, interactive structure 
determined by process. 
Connectedness and Configuration. Because of this paradigm 
shift, scientists now define how matter and particles 
influence one another, how in non-organic life an object in 
passing by is invited into and brings connectedness and 
combinations out of which something else is attracted and 
occurs. In turn from this new coherence and movement a new 
presence has availability which reshapes the outer config¬ 
uration and at the same time creates a new enriched 
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interior. A new chemistry begins; different isolations, 
differing resources and opportunities than before. Perhaps 
radically different,perhaps only as a valence, but dif¬ 
ferent. This patterned energy provides an attraction 
between substances; they come together, coalesce. Samples 
(1981; 1) calls this a sort of gravitations dance harvested 
by the silent inward breath of gravity." Gravitational 
interactions are thought to be the result of interactions of 
subatomic particles called 'gravitons.' These define the 
movement that takes place when objects are in each others 
presence. There are external and interior space config¬ 
urations, or as Buber and Teilhard say, there is a "within" 
and a "without" of things. 
Relational, The Central Dynamic. We began our section on 
Teilhard with the assertion that human life emerges from a 
combination of elements, sperm, and egg. We look now more 
closely at this phenomena using the concept of energy 
against the backdrop of the paradigm of new physics. 
Viewed separately and away from each other, both the 
sperm and the egg are active independent cells. As long as 
they remain distant, their activities continue for a few 
days; they wane, and are resorbed. If these cells are 
placed in the same medium, an attraction occurs, an 
interactional movement of presence; the cells begin to swarm 
toward each other. In their combining, if conditions are 
right, something unique happens, fertilization. In this 
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union something new and distinct occurs. Neither the sperm 
nor the egg could do alone what they now can do together. 
There is a new enriched configuration, which now invites or 
attracts new patterns from a sustaining utero that bathes it 
continuously. From the harmony of the patterned gathering 
of sperm and egg, a new resonance emerges and invites new 
patterns. Because of the enrichment of dynamic interactive 
patterns, a substantive leap to a new other evolves which is 
defined as the beginning of life. 
This is beyond the previous notion of primary affili¬ 
ation. Unity is the norm. There is an order of otherness. 
While viewing the sperm and the egg initially, they are seen 
as separate cells possessing a way, or level of their own 
independence and individuality. Within the dynamic movement 
of attraction and coming together, there is a trend away 
from this level of isolated individuality. In this new 
context of patterned energy there occurred the 'discovery' 
of the other prior to fertilization. With the coming 
together, the combination of pattern energy activity, a 
different, richer, more complex unit—or other emerges with 
new presence. individuation has been reshaped. There is a 
new configuration without and within. This other level of 
individuality is achieved only because of invitation. 
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attractivesness, connectedness, and integration. 
As we stated earlier, from the convergence of elements 
® ^^ihical transition occurs, a significantly different 
shift of deeply attracted elements to a new single life from 
emergence. It is a dynamic of engagement, complexity, 
maturation; an integrative process of individuation through 
coalescense. 
In the field of embryology these are the principles of 
ontogeny. In philosophical location with Buber, these are 
the principles of orientation and realization. In the study 
of evolution, these are Teilhard's principles of tangential 
and radial energy, the law of complexity-consciousness. Our 
point here is crucial and bears repeating: what happens 
phylogentically happens within the individual. This is 
quite simply what ontogeny, philosphy, and evolution teach 
us framed in the paradigm of new physics. What happens 
interiorly, complexity, can only occur due to the presence 
of others; implosion within simultaneously occurs with the 
interactions of others. This is consistent with the concept 
of patterned energy in new physics that state: individ¬ 
uation and uniqueness emerge through the continuous dynamic 
process of coming together. 
Incorporation, Interiorization. Dialectical Composition. 
Chapter II we introduced the concept of dialectical 
In 
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composition of address and response as a process of inter- 
iorizing others, and referred to this as a structure of 
mutuality. In Chapter III we included the constructs of 
Interpersonal Psychiatry and Object Relations to demonstrate 
how this interactive composition could be harmoniously 
balanced and/or become incongruent in the ecology of self. 
In Chapters IV and V we have attempted to enrich and 
solidify our concept of dialectical composition by placing 
it in a philosophy and anthropology which had new meaning 
and flowed from the paradigm shift of new physics, never 
departing from the view of the individual as an interactive 
agent constructing his reality. 
The question we are examining and the focus of our 
search is not that there is an interactive response system 
involving others, but how and to what extent this occurs. 
There is essential agreement in all models of personality 
that something takes place whereby an interacting system, an 
arena in which interacting parts are represented, Freud 
used the term 'incorporation', discussed internal images 
like little screens, and defended against connotations of 
cannabalism, Harry Stack Sullivan adopted the expression 
'interiorization', to depart from Freudian problems and 
applied the notion of a template compressed upon the infant. 
Klein and Fairbairn focused on single incorporation, 
introjection, and projection of the mother's breast, and are 
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too limited in their position. Mead describes 'taking the 
role of others' and posits his notion of impulse, 'I and 
me', and responds to the criticism of social determinism and 
ambiguous thinking. 
It is our opinion that the vulnerability of Mead's 
constructs suffer because of the inadequacy and incon¬ 
sistencies with the paradigm he utilizes. Ours is an 
advantage of the availability of investigations, conclu¬ 
sions, and insights from a scientific community recently 
developed and in the process of integration. 
The notion of dialectical composition, harmoniously 
emerges with the evidences and observations of this new 
paradigm. As required, it is compatible, consistent, and 
congruent with the broad context of this paradigm. 
Summary. Like any life form, self is not a mechanistic 
thing or interior little man, but a process configured by 
connectedness and combinations, movement and coalescence, 
enriched as an interior through interactions with others, 
which linguistically is referred to as I. It is a process 
that is dynamic and on-going, proportional and pivotal to 
others-in-presence as they move into the patterned energy of 
this process and impact within. When resonant, there is 
enrichment, affirmation, growth, increased complexity, 
development. When non-resonant, there is movement to 
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incongruency, withdrawal, non-adaptive reassemblage to what 
already is. Integration does not occur. Dependent on the 
place where the organizaton of self is occurring in these 
non-resonant interacts, the ecology of self may become 
closed, problematic, and imbalanced. 
Within this contextualization interwoven with Symbolic 
Interaction, Interpersonal Psychiatry, Object Relations, 
Buber, and Teilhard in the orchestration of the new physics, 
we turn now to specifically posit our own relational theory 
of self. 
CHAPTER V I 
A BIUNIAL THEORY OF SELF 
Our proposition is that the self emerges in union with 
others. Drawing on the evidences and observations of 
previous chapters, it is time to seek their synthesis and 
attempt to confirm this proposition with a theory of self 
and explanations of its constitutive elements. This study 
has been developing a specific model by describing meaning 
and reality, not as pre-existing and intrinsic to objects, 
but rather as an inner process of dialectical composition 
generated out of interaction, as a reflective perspective 
acknowledging reality as a human construction. To context¬ 
ualize this position comprised of the constructs delineated 
in the preceding chapters, a singular theory of a relational 
self is introduced, followed by a concise definition and 
explantion. 
At this point it is well to be reminded that this study 
is dealing with actual behavior. It is not always easy to 
remember that internalized interacts are basic behavioral 
mobilizations, incipient perhaps, but act organizations 
nonetheless. 
A Biunial Theory of Self. We have viewed the self as an 
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unfolding enriched configuration of interactional movement 
of presence with significant others, and described how the 
invitation, attraction, connectedness, and integration of 
symbolic components emerges as 
From the coordination of our evidence and cohesiveness of 
our structure, we now assert a two-level theory to account 
for this complexity/unity. Because we perceive self as a 
composition of elements achieving a critical transitional 
stage of integrative resonance in interacts with others we 
then in synergistic style refer to our position as a biunial 
theory of self. Self is essentially relational, i.e., 
indispensably characterized and constituted through the 
interactions of others, qualitatively a phenomenon of con¬ 
nectedness. In other words, it is the combination, the 
bringing together, that accounts for some unique and yet one 
result. In turn, or co-extensively, it is now prepared and 
fertile for additional component enrichment, blending, and 
configurational transition, for a biunial composition is not 
a static produce but rather an on-going process of afferent 
and efferent sources. In this study the result, or this 
unique one, is the self and the combinative elements of this 
fusion are the interconnected components of self image and 
self concept. These elements are referred to below as Level 
I (self images) and Level II (self concept). 
96 
Lev^]^. Self images are simply socially defined roles such 
as wife, son, therapist, congressperson, etc.; we choose and 
are overtime participants. These self images are activated 
frequently due to the fundamental human activity of dialec¬ 
tical composition of address and response. Dialectical 
composition is continuous throughout life, so self images 
are affected, altered, affirmed, denied, etc. on an on-going 
basis. Self images are those immediate reference points 
about our self within socially defined roles; however, there 
is also a qualitative ingredient of ascription to them. For 
example, roles such as wife, therapist, baseball player, 
etc., also contain a dimension of imputation concerning 
those roles in specific interacts. The repeated inability 
of a third baseman to field and throw out a batter plays 
havoc with the image of being a competent third baseman. A 
surgeon who loses several patients and whose malpractice 
insurance dramatically escalates has difficulty with the 
image of being a fine surgeon. Self images are multiple as 
we grow and develop individually. They occur as we engage 
in express interacts with others (Mead). They become a- 
rranged and measurable, organized and workable in 
experiential I-It relations (Buber), as we tangentially fan 
out or seek in additonal situations support and progression 
of these images (Teilhard). 
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Level—Each of us is able to perceive of self as rather 
constant, integrated, balanced, harmonious whole due to self 
concept. Self concept simply refers to those superordinate 
personifications such as being responsible, good, moral, 
peaceful, etc., which provide coherence and coalescense to 
self. Self concept develops simultaneously, takes shape, 
and centers as it is fed into continguously by activated 
self images. For example, Martha may think of herself as 
responsible from the perception of her family, friends, and 
co-workers for possessing the same attrubutes of finishing 
important tasks on time and completely in a caring, helpful, 
tidy way while not shirking other commitments and duties. 
Self concept provides consistency and integration, yet it is 
not inviolate or permanent. Rather self concept is vulner¬ 
able and flexible because its source and reference is from 
delineating interactions of self images. Self concept then 
is subject to scrutiny and doubt; for example, am I 
responsible or moral depending on some incident? 
The origins of self concept are initiated with the 
earliest feelings of bonding and the infant's relationally 
internalizing less me/more more and good/bad experiences 
(Object Relation Theory). General personifications develop 
and emerge from increasing interactions that begin to 
differentiate according to responses received enabling 
infants to become objects to themselves (Sullivan). The 
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differentiation of meaning structures of self arise as well 
as the ability to construct more complex action. 
It IS our position that the superordinate personifi¬ 
cations of self concept are not limited to the mothering- 
one, but rather are co-extensively nurtured by life long 
activated self images and are the source of personality 
integration and coherence. This level of self concept is 
the level of I-Thou (Buber) and complexification (Teilhard) 
of enrichment, centricity, and convergency. It is the 
combination of these two levels as well as understanding the 
origin, growth, expanding, arranging, combining dynamics of 
units out of which individuation occurs that we conclude 
with this biunial theory and define self in the following 
manner . 
A Definition of Self. For this study we concisely propose 
the definition of self as an on-going, emerging, synergistic 
process of interiorizing significant others. 
The Inner Forum: An On-Going Process of Dialectical 
Composition. In previous chapters we outlined and expanded 
the tenet of Symbolic Interactionism that it is within a 
symbolic world, rather than a physical one, that individuals 
are truly human. The "out there" of physical reality 
exists, but that is not what is responded to directly. 
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Rather, in the context of the human act, there is a "within" 
of meaning, definitions achieved through interacting with 
others. This is the reality toward which individuals act. 
Reality then may be defined in any given interaction 
according to their internalized attitudes. As discussed in 
Chapter II, between the "out there" (address) and the 
individual's activity/behavior (response) is meaning, a 
perspective, the reflective noting of these things to 
ourselves. In other words, there is no meaningful reality 
outside of an individual's perception of it or action in 
relationship to it. In this way the self is an object, for 
as a perspective each may act toward, stand outside of, 
assess, modify, and so on in the reflective process of 
unfolding acts. This perspective develops through the inter- 
iorizing of others occurring in the dialectical composition 
of address and response, alternately taking on each others 
perception and assigning meaning. With dialetical composi¬ 
tion comes the ability, or quality, to be a subject to 
oneself, to gain a sense of self as an initiating actor with 
a perspective. 
In this manner then dialectical composition may be 
interpreted as the fundamental human activity in that it is 
how a perspective acquired and maintained. It is through 
dialectical composition that individuals are reciprocal to 
It is what Buber calls "betweenness", the one another . 
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process through which a living center evolves, which is 
common to all. Dialectical composition provides the 
presence of others who are the bearer of meaning 
and hence the position, out of relationships comes the 
meaning of self. It is the composition of address and 
response, which was introduced and developed in Chapters II 
and IV, that adds qualitively to Mead's proposition of the 
inner form. 
We stated earlier that consciousness is formed through 
participation in shared reality, the interiorizing of others 
though dialectical composition. The perspectives of others 
are internalized. In the course of any particular interact, 
an individual does not only respond to the encountered 
other, but also to a host of other historical internalized 
figures of which he may be more or less aware. These may be 
other individuals, groups, or personificiations of society 
in general. Mead used the terms "inner forum" to describe 
this complexity, and "generalized other" to connote these 
accrued internal figures. He likened it to a stage of 
central actors and supporting cast in an internal drama. 
For example, at center stage the individual and the encount¬ 
ered other with whom he is engaged play out the immediate or 
primary dialectic. Additionally on this internal stage are 
significant figures whose perspectives the actors also adopt 
Mead's description may be helpful in while interacting. 
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thinking of the inner forum as a stage upon which complex 
dramas are enacted, some players standing out clearly to the 
individual, while others (such as parents, colleagues, 
religious prescriptions, etc.) form background action like a 
chorus. The point Mead emphasizes is that the experience of 
consciousness and thought can be alternately described as 
the ability to act, to be a subject, in the context of 
internalized social process. 
Like other objects and meaning, self is a symbolic 
construction; self is the internal objectification of the 
person. Within the context of interaction in which an 
individual is involved, he notes himself from other's 
perspectives and in so doing attributes qualitities, proper¬ 
ties, values, and so on to himself. Self then becomes the 
symbolic location of the actor in his social construction of 
reality. It is the person responding to himself from the 
internalized role of the other. Self then cannot be thought 
of as an entity, as something we have, any more than other 
derivatives of social interaction. It is a process, 
socially created, maintained, and transformed in social 
interaction.. It is a process neither age bound nor other 
limited. In this view selves are always changing in 
accordance with our changing activity. But, does this not 
raise a problem? Do not most of us attribute a high degree 
of constancy over time and experience to our notion of 
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ourselves? By distinguishing between self image and self 
concept this apparent dilemma can be resolved. 
Image and Self Concept. Self image refers to the 
immediate personification of ourselves within the inner 
forum during any given interaction. In this theory this is 
Level I. It is how individuals see themselves within an 
immediate activity. While playing hockey I may see myself as 
strong and coordinated. Later on at a board meeting, I may 
attribute administrative ability to myself in meeting with 
colleagues about policy decisions. Self images are 
constantly changing as interactions change in our day-to-day 
roles or experiences. 
Level I accounts for William James' notion that we have 
as many selves as we have memberships in different social 
groups, and what Mead cites as all sorts of different selves 
answering to all sorts of different social relations such as 
family, religious, friends, etc. In this biunial theory, 
these type of interactions feed into Level II. 
Beyond these immediate personifications will be the 
internalized perspectives of larger parts of a social 
network or self concept from which perspectives I may see 
myself as a good person as I play hockey or share policy 
deciion; my experience, however, will be that I feel I am a 
good person having internalized these perspectives as my 
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own. Certainly from these more global perspectives (Level 
II) one can experience self-constancy in spite of ever- 
changing self images (Level I). For example, I may see 
myself as moral from the perspective of my family, col¬ 
leagues, and friends, for possessing the same attributes, 
i.e., honesty, consideration, etc. One forms a self concept 
that gives the appearance of consistency over time, and to a 
great extent is somewhat constant. Yet this does not imply 
one possesses a self as an entity out of the context of 
social process. 
Level I self images then are those socially defined 
roles such as wife, husband, policeman, etc., that are 
activated when individuals are expressly engaged in specific 
interactions. Self images are situationally bound, they are 
multiple, and subject to change. Level II self concept, 
however, is more of an overlay, or umbrella, of superor¬ 
dinate personifications which are socially confirmed or 
disconfirmed from others in the engagement of actuated self 
images. Is not much of our activity and striving, perhaps 
most of it, directed toward establishing and maintaining 
social contexts that are supportive of desired self images, 
or toward changing situations interpreted as imposing 
unwanted or conflictural self images? 
Self images result and are affected in specific 
interacts of the dialectical composition of address and 
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response. This links us with others and is the process of 
how we hold, measure, arrange, and bind; it is how events 
become organized and workable. Co-extensively self concept, 
or these superordinate personficiations cluster and in¬ 
tegrate into an enriched interior of greater centricity and 
meaningful configuration. Self concept provides integration 
and consistency, increases congruence, and draws us forward 
to further convergency. Out of this configuration, or 
complexification, the meaning of self evolves. 
In our model there is no intention to connote the 
complexity of the "inner forum" as an increasingly numerical 
overload of additional internalized others in some hierar- 
chial structure. Clearly, the "inner forum" becomes more 
complex, more intricate, but not more cumbersome. Rather 
like all life forms, the complexity of consciousness refers 
to a greater richness and centricity of internal organiza¬ 
tion . 
Emerging. We have just submitted that the self is an on- 
going process to assert the notion of activity and growth, 
and to reject any association with the view of a 
mechanistic static entity deterministrically and exclusively 
shaped in early childhood. Although at first blush the 
word, emerging, may seemingly be redundant, we include it in 
definition to connote the notion of implosion in the 
our 
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biunial process. Perhaps it is possible to think of some¬ 
thing as an on-going process, or simply getting larger, and 
not at the same time being unique, or as an unfolding 
interior event. We wish to guard against the misconception, 
and preserve our philosophical and anthropological compati¬ 
bility. 
Philosophically we defined existence as an integrative 
dynamic of dialectical composition. Experiencing in every¬ 
day life is a simultaneously inward event of unity and 
individuality. The fundamental activity of life, address 
and response, is a polar composition conducted in exper¬ 
iences and at the same time internally arranging and 
enriching. "Orientation" and "realization" are but two 
dynamics of the same whole process. While experiencing the 
"without", there is simultaneously in the same patterned 
energy an arranging and directional shaping "within". As 
Buber says, the experiences are form-giving, arranging the 
interior more deeply for the continuous "realization" of 
experiences. Due to this polar event, which is only brought 
through the presence of others, there is a blending, a 
coalescence, so dramatically integrative that something new 
develops, a new occurrence different from before, out of 
which we discover and experience self. It is a "shared 
center" out of which we discover and experience self. It is 
a "shared center" which impels the beginning, the becoming. 
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and the continuity of We use the work, emerging, to 
reflect the philosophical roots of this biunial theory that 
out of unity comes individuation. 
We solidified our philosophical position that the self 
evolves in critical transition to a single emergent form by 
studying complexity from the view of anthropology and 
evolution. We found our proposition consistently balanced 
with this data and observations, i.e., from a unity of 
elements a distinct, different, new form emerges. Maturity 
is the continuous development of complexity, a greater 
richness of internal organization occurring in convergency. 
Teilhard demonstrates that reflectivity, to be aware of 
being aware, the capability of is a complex cohesive 
force occurring in the phylum of man, representative of a 
critical shift to a new level. He unravels evolution in the 
context of energy and accounts for this movement to complex- 
ification as tangential and radial energy. At every 
phylogenetic place there is a "within" and a "without", 
unceasing, irreversible, and unfolding. It is twofold: 
collecting, enriching, form-giving, and afferent in unifying 
and integrating the interior centering, while measuring, 
arranging, ascending, and efferent in the expanding 
exterior. Consciousness then is a process of unity. It is 
the co-ex tensive, co-evolutionary critical point that 
continuously unfolds in relationship with others. Thus the 
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word, emerging, also represents the support of anthropology 
for this biunial theory, that out of unity comes individ¬ 
uation . 
The concept of emergence is crucial for it binds 
together the constructs of philosophy, anthropology, and the 
paradigm of new physics which provide our theory with 
coherence and congruence. It emphasizes how connectedness 
impels, how relational combinations are a renewed chemistry 
of progressive enrichment, and how this patterned energy 
becomes a substantive leap in the order of otherness. 
How does this emergence occur? What is its form? What 
do we call this process? 
Synergy. We utilize the term, synergy, with some hesitation 
as it may apparently evoke confusion. However, we prefer it 
to the term synthesis, as we believe it to be more 
paradigmatically precise within the biunial theory. Synergy 
is defined as "cooperative action of discrete agencies such 
that the total effect is greater than the sum of the two or 
more parts" (Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1964; 
2330). It is simply that the result is greater than the sum 
of the parts. Looking at the same source, synthesis is 
defined as "a combination of separate elements into a whole" 
(Webster, 1964; 2321). Or simply, within the whole the 
parts are separable and distinguishable. Synergy is truly 
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more accurate within our paradigm shift which views objects 
as dynamic, relational structures determined by process. 
The term, synergy, is utilized to reflect this relation- 
alism, which Gregory Bateson suggests should be the basis of 
all definitions. 
As a synergy then, we view the self as an interde¬ 
pendent, interactive process of Levels I and II continuously 
producing the configurative perspective which is called "I", 
and is no longer separable or distinguishable. 
This is the biunial process that occurs through the 
presence and interiorization of others. In presence there 
is an entrance, an attraction, as energies of address and 
response move into each other's resonant space and co¬ 
mingle, are re-arranged and become in this reshaping. In 
the interactivity of this energy there is a connection of 
interior mutuality which results in a movement and new 
coherence to different and new internal way of being 
present, which in turn has new availability not present 
before and into which the opportunity for the discovery of 
new presence-of-others becomes possible. Whether radical 
and immediate or persistent and gradual, there is another 
pattern or configuration of enrichment and complexity that 
has occurred. The interiorizaiton of others has been 
gathered within the inner forum, and another way, or level 
of engaging, perceiving, and experiencing the world has 
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emerged. This is the biunial process, the interior intimate 
combination of one's existing perspective, or objectif¬ 
ication of self, with the perspective of others out of which 
emerges the proclamation It is an emergent coherence, 
so reshaped in interior complexity, that is configuration is 
synergistic. 
The "within", the on-going configuration of individ¬ 
uation has been reshaped, deepened, reaffirmed; the 
"without", ways of meeting the world, mobilization for 
activity, maturity, readiness for development and re¬ 
patterned. From convergence a transition of self has 
occurred, out of the integrative process of coalesence with 
others individuality emerges as a synergistic phenomenon. 
Significant Others. Irrespective of potential, it is 
obvious that not everyone, or every object, encountered in 
the experience of living is interiorized within the inner 
forum in the intimate process we have described. In Chapter 
I we posited Ornstein's "principle of selective attention" 
regarding stimuli and objects. The indispensable others-in- 
presence we refer to and comprise that resonant component of 
synergy is more precisely identified as significant others. 
The significant other is that external source that is 
internalized in becoming an object to ourselves and how we 
define ourselves. It is the perspectives of those certain 
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others within the inner forum that provide the ability to 
stand outside and view ourself. It is these internalized 
others than allow us to symbolically locate ourself in the 
construction of reality. Because we use the work symbolic, 
we do not imply any metaphorical intent or exchange. This 
interiorization is symbolic, but nonetheless real, as the 
symbolic is our reality. We do not claim any physical 
consummation of these others, yet we strongly assert that 
significant others are imported into the neuromuscular 
system of the individual, incipient to be sure, but be¬ 
havioral mobilizations and act organizations nonetheless. 
Interiorizing. Mead defined the mechanism for incorporating 
significant others internally as 'taking the role of 
others". Role, however, has proven too ambiguous a term as 
it implies a distinction from what is real; i.e., role and 
real are not the same, such as one plays a role and is not 
himself being real. In Chapters II and V we explained the 
concept somewhat differently and concluded it was a process 
of communications, which because of its intricacies, we 
termed dialectical composition. We pointed out how meaning 
and reality is created in communicative acts in achieving 
agreement around objects in the process of address and 
response. Because human beings act primarily through the 
currency of communication, reality is a dialectic 
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construction. It is a system of achieving meaning. With 
reference to the self, such meaning is constituted in the 
process of interiorization. Through dialectical composition 
we are able to be an object to ourself, to address ourself 
anew and respond. 
Achieving that critical transitional point with signif¬ 
icant others in which emergence occurs is not dependent on 
the physical proximity of the other; it is not proportionate 
to any special measurement. Rather the importation of 
significant others rests proportionally and pivotally on the 
presence achieved through dialectical composition. Inter¬ 
iorization then is the ability to internalize significant 
others in the dialectical composition of address and 
response, an interacting synergistic system of the inner 
forum. 
Essentially Relational. We have outlined how the self is 
this more complex unity of the inner forum continually 
emerging as individuality, and how this is an irreversible 
process. We contend that this is how individuality is 
configured in a synergistic event blending significant 
others with a present objectification of self. Without 
significant others there would be no way to achieve this 
emergence. Similiarly, as the sperm and the egg could not 
do alone what they can do together, so also the self and 
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significant others. It is in this way in the context of a 
paradigm supported and crystallized in philosophy, anthro¬ 
pology, embryology. Interpersonal Psychiatry, and Object 
Relations Theory that we assert the biunial self as 
essentially relational, and say with Symbolic Interaction- 
ists, "We are our others." 
Implications for Human Services: Education and Therapy. 
Since it is constructed within a paradigm shift, the theory 
of the biunial self would have substantive impact as an 
applied theory. How it can be specifically applied is 
subject for another lengthy work or dissertaion. However, 
there are two general implications of theory application 
that in part initiated this study. To comment briefly on 
these will bring our inquiry and design full circle. 
Education. In the field of education the biunial theory 
would significantly alter the traditional goals and 
objectives of teacher-training and role definition. 
Education could no longer be exclusively viewed as a 
product-oriented structure requiring the amassing of facts 
within a specified time period using more electronic 
technology and testing for physical survival. Most 
professionals and parents agree that schools, and 
specifically teachers, are the greatest social influence on 
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young people. Yet it is this very system and its profes¬ 
sionals who, by raising and re-inforcing standards of 
competitive product results which demand uniformity, create 
unhealthy power criteria, and label children learning 
disabled, have become the instruments of conformity, broken 
connections, and poor self images. Teachers that emphasize 
success as being right at the expense of being open, looking 
to authority, how to be passive, and test for packaged 
feedback create diseased and learning disabled environments. 
Someone once remarked: No one is a genius, some are just 
less damaged than others. 
From a biunial perspective teachers would need to 
perceive another level of inherent responsibility in their 
role for a shift from a mechanistic to more relational, or 
biunial, framework would focus primary responsibility on 
being significant others in their interactions with 
students. Instruction would then be viewed as a particular 
dynamic within the context of dialetical composition. 
Teaching and learning would then be an arranging, enriching 
process of developing and locating a sense of self, as it 
occurs through events of activated self images and the 
process of interiorization contributing to superordinate 
personifications of the student (and teacher). The 
utilization of computer-age hardware and the developing 
trend of increased student time, dependency, and testing on 
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these electronic aids that simply reinforce right answers 
would be viewed as a debilitating venture when they become 
an end product and goal, and students are tested back to 
this. More fundamentally, teaching and learning is a 
process of affirmation well beyond the level where right 
answers are reinforced, but rather where internalized values 
that become part of the self are generated in teacher- 
student interaction. This is not to say that electronic 
technology does not have a place, but that is should not be 
viewed as the critical focal point of learning. It is 
personal interactions that need to become the focus of 
lesson plan preparation. For it is in the process of these 
interactions that a sense of self develops and grows, and 
the value of learning becomes cherished through the inter- 
iorization of others. 
Teaching environments based on biunial theory would 
ensure designs of space and time for interpersonal events to 
reduce the overwhelming authority structure and passive 
expectation demands for students. 
The success and evaluation of teachers could not be 
narrowly confined within a biunial theory to simply national 
and regional performance scores of students, but would be 
assessed also on interactional skills that provide for 
positive activated self images among students. The measures 
of student poor performance would require a relational 
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assessment method to focus on the student's relation to 
other students, to the teacher, etc., before appropriate 
remedial interventions could be chosen. 
The theory of biunial self as applied in education 
would emphasize affirmation of self images rather than 
having the right information once and for all. It would 
view learning as a life-long process, not a limited product. 
It would reward candor and integrity, not conformity and 
authoritative dependence. It would see self images as the 
generator of performance, not enshrine performance. It 
would be concerned with potentials, not simply norms. 
Classrooms would be designed for interaction, not efficiency 
and teacher convenience. This theory would not need to 
generate questions about how to achieve norms, obedience, 
and correct answers. Rather it would generate questions 
about how to motivate for long-life learning, strengthen 
self images, and affirm self concepts. 
Therapy. The implications of a relational biunial theory 
for applied psychotherapy would, for example, require the 
development of diagnostic tools or protocols to assess 
various self images and superordinate personifications of 
self concept. A number of diagnostic techniques could 
reveal the relational foundations and aspects of an 
individual's life in order to clarify teatment objectives 
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Biunial interventions could include the involvements of 
significant others in the treatment plan. The structure of 
various interventions is important, but much more critical 
is the process designed for a particular structure utilizing 
binunial techniques of becoming a significant other and 
activating focused self images to effect healing and health. 
Techniques would be designed to specifically effect the 
relationship between client and therapist, for it is the 
relationship, the personal interaction, that underlies and 
sustains therapeutic change. 
This theory also radically shifts the role of 
therapist. Since it focuses on what occurs in relations, 
the personal interactions between therapist and client 
should be viewed as crucial for effecting health change. 
The approach to therapy does not begin with the mindset that 
the presenting difficulties are fundamentally in-the-person, 
but rather tend to be interactional in nature. By becoming 
a significant other, the therapist would have unique access 
to the client's inner world, become sought after, then 
targeted with unhealthy issues, and so have an opportunity 
to structure a process of healing. The therapeutic process 
takes place in this external, face to face interaction 
utilizing dialectical composition of address and response 
interiorizing the therapist in the task of self 
construction. Unlike transference of psychonanalysis, it is 
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something that happens in the very relationship between the 
therapist and client in the present moment of this relation¬ 
ship with here and now gualities. 
Because therapy is relational, the therapist would also 
need to recognize the impact on his or her own levels of 
self image and self concept. Clients then, like professors, 
colleagues, and mentors, would be perceived a significant in 
the interiorizing construction of the therapist self image 
and growth. 
Conclusion, We began this study to clarify what is denoted 
by the term, self, and to propose a coherent forumlation of 
the genesis and development of self. Our primary problem 
specifically centered on the ambiguous presentation of the 
Symbolic Interactionalist model on this point. Mead's 
attempt at clarity using the component notion of "I and me" 
and the mechanism of role-taking, could not protect him from 
the sting of his critics. His students' attempts at ampli¬ 
fication and to account for an integrative process fared no 
better, 
It is our opinion that their difficulty stemmed from an 
inability to locate an appropriate and coherent connector of 
how significant others are imported into a self system and 
specifically to what effect. Mead and his students were 
people of their day. In a sense they were 
"new frontier 
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iconoclasts; and opposition was found in all quartors. By 
broadening our examination, garnering support and affirma¬ 
tion in the fields of philosophy and anthropology, as well 
as the insightful theory of Object Relations, and then 
contextualizing this in a powerful paradigm shift, it is our 
belief that our model of self as essentially relational 
resolves the problem. 
We view Harry Stack Sullivan's Interpersonal Psychiatry 
as a prototype in reference to a relational model. His 
tripartite early development theory, concept of rudimentary 
objectification, and system of personifications of important 
others are significant departures from the psychoanalytic 
tradition. His emphasis on the mothering-one as the primary 
certain other, however, belies his total departure and is 
somewhat conflictual with his position that the source of 
self is important to others and that they are maintained as 
form and direction throughout life. In addition to our 
problem with his exclusive emphasis on the mothering-one, 
our basic difficulty with his theory is the notion of a 
template pressed on some kind of a mold out of which appears 
a self. 
Object Relations Theory view maturation as a movement 
from absolute dependence to mature dependence on 
internalized others (Winnicott, 1964). There appears little 
question that interactionists would agree with this idea of 
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i^^tur© d©p©nd©nc© in that that individual consciousnass is 
thoroughly dependent on the internalization of others. 
Object Relations Theory, however, goes beyond the inter- 
actionists in discussing experience prior to internalization 
of others, the process of internalization itself, and a 
unique position of unconsciousness. We find these contribu¬ 
tions most valuable and compatible. Obviously, we disagree 
in some rather primary areas of Freudian constructs, yet we 
fundamentally agree with Fairbairn and Winnicott on how the 
self first begins to emerge in action constructions from a 
condition of primary unbrokenness with the mother. Addi¬ 
tionally, we strongly favor impulsiveness-to-act as the pre¬ 
condition for dialectical encounters that gradually develop 
as objectifications. 
Bubar grounds our study philosophically in the 
convergent dialectical center of address and answer. 
Teilhard provides the connectors of anthropological con¬ 
straints with complexity-consciousness. The paradigm of new 
physics coalesces a context for the congruent conclusion of 
a new biunial theory, the self as a relational phenonemon 




Arieti, Silvano. (Edit.)/ American Handbook of Psychiatry, 
N.Y.: Basic Books, 1966. 
Bateson, Gregory. Mind and Nature. New York; Dutton, 
1979. 
Berger, P. L. and Luckman T. The Social Construction of 
Reality : A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. 
Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966. 
Blumer, Herbert. "Society as Symbolic Interaction." In 
Human Behavior and Social Processes. Edited by 
Arnold Rose. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston: 
1962. 
_. "Sociological Implications of the Thought 
of George Herbert Mead." American Journal of 
Sociology. 71: 535-46. 
_. Symbolic Interactionism; Perspective and 
Method. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969. 
Bohm, David. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. 
Buber, Martin. I and Thou. 2nd ed. Translated by Ronald 
Gregor Smith. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1958. 
. The Knowledge of Man: A Philosophy of the 
Interhumaru Translated with introduction by Maurice 
Friedman. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 
Inc. 1965. 
Capra, Fritjot. The Turning Point. 
Schuster, 1982. 
New York: Simon and 
Carson, Robert C. Interactional Concepts of Personality. 
Chicago: Aldine Publisher Co., 1969. 
Chauchard, Paul. Man and Cosmos, Scientific Phenomenology 
of Teilhard de Chardin. New York:Herder and 
Herder , 1965. 
Deizen, Norman. "The Genesis of Self in Early Childhood." 
In Human Behavior and Social Process. Edited by 
Arnold Rose, Boston: 1962. 
121 
Diamond, Malcolm. Martin Buber. New York: Oxford Press, 
1960. ' 
Fairbairn, W. R. D. An Object Relations Theory of the 
Personality. New York: Basic Books, 1952. 
Ferguson, Marilyn. The Aquarian Conspiracy. California: 
J. P. Tarcher Press, 1980. 
Foy, M. D., James. "Man in the Behavioral Sciences." In 
The World of Teilhard. Edited by Rb. Francoeur. 
Baltimore: Helicon Press 1961. 
Galtung, John. Theories and Methods of Social Research. 
Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1977. 
Guntrip, Harry. Psychoanaltic Theory, Therapy, and the 
Self. New York: Basic Books, 1971. 
_• "British Schools of Psychoanalysis: The 
Object Relations Theory of W. R. D. Fairbairn." In 
American Handbook of Psychiatry. Edited by S. 
Ariety. New York: Basic Books, 1966. 
_. Personality Structure and Human 
Interaction. New York: International Universities 
Press, Inc. 1961. 
Huxley, Julian. "The Introduction." In The Aquarian 
Conspiracy. California: J. P. Tarcher Press, 1980. 
Karp, A. and Yoels, I. Symbolic Interaction. New York: 
Basic Books, 1979. 
Klein, Melanie. Love, guilt, and reparation; and other 
works. New York: Delta, 1975. 
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. 
Leary, Timothy. Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality. 
New York: Ronald Press Co., 1957. 
Lehman, I. and Mehrens, W. (edit). Educational Research. 
New York: Holt, Rhinehart, Winston, Inc. 1971. 
Manheim, Werner. Martin Buber. New York: Twayne 
Publishers, Inc. 1974. 
Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago. 
University of Chicago Press, 1934. 
122 
Meltzer, Bernard. "Mead’s Social Psychology." in The 
Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research. 
Edited by G. Goslin, 1964. 
__• "Social Psychology of George Herbert 
Mead." In Kalamazoo Center for Socioloqical 
Research. 1972. 
Montagu, Ashley. Touching. The Human Significance of The 
Skin. New York: Harper and Row, 1978. 
Mullahy, Patrick. "Early Personality Development as Viewed 
by Harry S. Sullivan. In Behavior in Infancy and 
Early Childhood. New York: The Free Press, 1967. 
McCall, George and Simmons, J. L. Identities and 
Interactions. New York: The Free Press, 1966. 
Ornstein, Robert. The Psychology of Consciousness. New 
York: Penguin Books, 1972. 
Pierce, Joseph Chilton. Magical Child. New York: Banton 
Books, 1977. 
_. Exploring The Crack in the Cosmic Egg. New 
York: Pocket Books, 1974. 
Rychlak, Joseph. Personality and Psychotherapy. Boston: 
Houghton-Miff1in Co., 1973. 
Samples, Bob. Mind of our Mother. Reading, Mass: Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Co., Inc. 1981. 
. The Metaphoric Mind. Reading, Mass: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc. 1981. 
Simon, Julian. Basic Research Methods. New York: Random 
House, 1978. 
Shibutani, Tamotsu. "Reference Groups and Social Control." 
In Human Behavior and Social Processes. Edited by 
Arnold Rose. Chicago: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962. 
. "Reference Groups as Perspectives.^^ 
AmerFcan Journal of Sociology* Vo. 69. 1955. 
Springer, S. and Deutsch, G. Left Brain, Right Brain. San 
Francisco: W. F. Freeman and Co., 1981. 
123 
Stryker, Sheldon. "Symbolic Interaction as an Approach to 
Family," American Journal of Socioloqv. Vol, 62. 
1956. ^ 
Sullivan, Harry S. The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. 
New York: Norton, 1953. 
Teilhard, De Chardin, Pierre. The Phenomenon of Man. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1959, 
_. The Future of Man. New York: Harper and 
Row, 1962. 
Human Energy. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Inc. 1969. 
Webster's Third International Dictionary, Springfield, Mass: 
G & C Merriam Company, 1961. 
Winnicott, D. The Maturational Processes and the 
Facilitating Environment. New York: International 
Universities Press, 1964. 
\ 
; \ 
t 
I 
1 
[ 

